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It was the purpose of this paper to describe the 
founding, building up, and maintaining of Burlington In- 
dustries, Incorporated, as a corporation primarily en- 
gaged in the manufacture, conversion, and sale of textiles. 
The attempt was begun with no preconceptions, except the 
assumption that Burlington Industries has been a major 
textile firm for about two decades. 
The main problem faced in the course of writing 
the paper was the difficulty of locating sources.  Most of 
the existing published sources were too brief, others 
were either too verbose or slanted.  One main source, the 
personal notebook of J. Spencer Love, was not available. 
Once the sources were located, an effort was made 
to separate the opinions from the facts; and on the basis 
of these facts, a chronological history of the corporation 
was written.  Opinions occur occasionally, but only to 
facilitate the writing of the paper according to the 
original plan.  Information was often obtained from direct 
interviews with persons acquainted with the subject, but 
such information was always complemented by written sources, 
so that references to oral interviews were omitted. 
V 
The main conclusions of the research are these: 
(1) Burlington has grown steadily ever since its founding; 
(2) the real test of the company's ability to survive as 
a leading concern has just begun to be felt.  If the 
historical record of Burlington to adapt itself success- 
fully to changing conditions is any basis, the company, 
it would seem, will remain a very strong one. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Textiles Is one of the world's oldest Industries. 
Records of spinning and weaving cloth can be traced as 
far back as five thousand years. The story of the Ameri- 
can textile industry began with the founding of the Slater 
Mill in Pawtucket, Rhode Island, in 1790. It was called 
the Slater Mill after its founder, Samuel Slater, whose 
textiles are often credited with starting the American 
Industrial Revolution.  For more than a century after the 
founding of this mill, the American textile mills were 
concentrated in the north-eastern part of the United 
States.  Since the beginning of the twentieth century, 
however, they have shifted to and prospered in the South. 
The story of the American textile industry has been 
an interesting one. The founders of the manufacturing 
concerns normally began with a small amount of capital, 
and those with the requisite ambition and perseverance, 
survived.  Others hardly survived the first generation. 
Thus there was a continuous change in the ownership of 
manufacturing operations.  This type of activity in the 
industry did not make the American textile industry a 
particularly strong one.  However, in the early 1920's a 
company was formed in Burlington, North Carolina, with 
the specific purpose of stabilizing the shaky textile 
industry in that community. The company was called 
Burlington Mills, as a tribute to the community where it 
was located.  Under the guidance of its brilliant adminis- 
trator, J. Spencer Love, (until 1962) the company succeeded 
phenominally.  Using rayon, the "poor man's silk," Bur- 
lington became so large and vigorous that today it is 
the major textile corporation in the United States.  It 
plans to become a similar one in Europe. 
CHAPTER I 
POUNDING AND EARLY YEARS 
James Spencer Love and the Pounding of Burlington Industries, 
Incorporated 
Burlington Industries, Incorporated, was founded by 
J. Spencer Love in 1923* and was then incorporated as 
Burlington Mills, Incorporated.   Spencer Love, as he 
preferred to be called, was the younger child (the other 
being his sister, Cornelia Love) of Professor and Mrs. 
James Lee Love.  His father was a native of North Carolina 
but had moved to Cambridge, Massachusetts, to teach 
mathematics at Harvard University.  Spencer Love was born 
in Cambridge, Massachusetts, on July 6, 1896, and was 
educated in the public schools of Cambridge and at Harvard. 
He displayed unusual industry even during his college 
years; he completed the usual four-year undergraduate 
work in only three years and devoted the fourth one to 
studies in Business in the University's Graduate School 
of Business Administration.  By his twenty-first birthday, 
Spencer Love had not only completed four years of studies 
at Harvard, and graduated, but he had completed training 
in the Army Officers Training School.  He failed the 
latter course but convinced his superiors to give him 
another try, and he was commissioned a first lieutenant 
soon after his twenty-first birthday. 
He then joined the United States army during World 
War I.  Based in Prance with the Seventy-Eighth Division 
of the U.S. Army, he proved to be a capable lieutenant 
and attained the rank of a major at age twenty-three. 
In 1919 General John Pershing gave him a personal citation 
for his "especially conspicuous and meritorious services." 
Thus Spencer Love earned another distinction which, he 
expected, would help him in finding a career. 
At the end of World War I, Love went back to his 
home in Cambridge and tried to settle down as a civilian. 
He could not find employment; and years later he remarked, 
"I was a bit shocked to find that no one gave much of a 
damn about my brand new Harvard degree that had taken me 
four years to acquire, or even my war record."   He always 
recollected those days of financial insecurity with an 
understandable contempt and bitterness.  That no one was 
willing to hire a young man with his talents and qualifi- 
cations Spencer Love could hardly accept. 
He left for North Carolina shortly afterwards. 
Later on he explained his decision to leave: 
After wearing out my shoe leather and the pave- 
ments of Boston's Boylston Street, I realized 
that Boston had an over abundance of cod, culture 
and average young men looking for jobs.  I hied 
myself to North Carolina and got myself a Job in 
an asthmatic, broken-down textile mill.  But at 
least it was a job.5 
The hope of getting a job with a textile firm in 
North Carolina was inspired by the fact that his family 
had connections in the industry.  "The Old Mill," as it 
was nick-named, and which Love very graphically described, 
was the Gastonia Cotton Manufacturing Company in Gastonia, 
North Carolina. The plant was the first one built in 
Gastonia and his grandfather, R.C.G. Love, had been its 
manager and president from its inception in 1887 until 
his death in 1908.  The position given to Spencer Love 
was that of the paymaster.   He began his new $120-a- 
month career in April, 1919.  But such a mediocre position 
was not for Spencer Love; he had too many talents and too 
much energy to be satisfied.  Soon afterwards therefore, 
he induced his father to launch a joint venture in a 
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textile mill of their own. 
The mill that the Loves bought was the same one 
which had employed Spencer Love.  It cost $250,000, but 
the Loves did not have any such amount of money.  The 
initial payment was made with the $3,000 that Spencer had 
6 
saved from his army salary, and a total of $80,000 bor- 
p 
rowed from a New York Commission House and a North Caro- 
lina bank. The balance, the loans, and interest on both 
were to be paid through future mill profits.  The mill 
they bought was not much, but at least it offered the 
kind of challenge that the younger Love longed for. 
Needless to say, the old-time business people did not 
think very highly of the "experimentation" of the Love 
clan.  Probably no other beginning manufacturers had 
utilized credit to the extent that the Loves did.  People 
were pleasantly surprised, however, when the Loves' 
operation did not "fold." 
But the new manufacturers soon encountered diffi- 
culties because of a sharp drop in cotton prices.  The 
problem, as the Loves realized, was not that they could 
not run a mill successfully, but that either a stable 
cotton price or an alternative and more profitable fiber 
was needed.  They did not panic because of the souring of 
the cotton business; they kept the business running until 
1923 when a local real estate boom enabled them to sell 
the building and property for $200,000 while they retained 
title to the machinery.  The machinery had to be put to 
work, so the natural thing to do was find another factory. 
In this task they were helped by the Burlington (N.C.) 
Chamber of Commerce, which wanted to revive its community's 
decaying textile industry.  In 1923* therefore, the Loves 
founded a new mill in Burlington with the help of the 
town's Chamber, which agreed to underwrite stock valued 
at $250,000 and sold it within the community.9  in July, 
1924, the first Burlington Mills plant was completed. 
In October of the same year Burlington Mills began its 
business.  The building that housed the new corporation's 
offices was a very modest one indeed. 
Making Rayon a Popular Fiber 
In October, 1924, when the first Burlington Mills 
plant went into operation, fiber prices were still low. 
So the problem of profits continued, and Spencer Love, 
the president of the company realized that a young company 
could not afford low profits, to say nothing of losses. 
He was also perspicuous enough to see that there was 
nothing to prevent the corporation from weaving fibers 
other than cotton.  But at the time there were only few 
other fibers available.  There were wool and silk, but it 
would have been impractical to rely on either or both of 
these.  The demand for woolen goods was limited, besides 
the fact that it was an expensive fiber.  Silk was produced 
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mostly In the Orient, so that would not have been a reliable 
trade.  Moreover, items made of silk commanded an even more 
limited market than woolen items. Thus, some other fiber 
had to be found. 
In 1924, there was only one other fiber that offered 
some hopes, and that was rayon,   the only man-made fiber. 
For centuries textile zealots had tried to duplicate the 
work of the silk worm by chemical and mechanical means 
much as the alchemists tried to produce gold from baser 
metals.  The first commercially successful man-made yarn 
was produced in France in 1891, by Count Hilaire de Char- 
donnet.  The new yarn was called "artificial silk" until 
1925, when, at the suggestion of Kenneth Lord of Galey & 
Lord, it was named rayon.  It was not much different In 
1924 than it was in 1891, but J. Spencer Love realized 
the potentialities it offered.  He therefore diverted 
the entire energies of the new corporation into refining 
it.  At the same time, blending existing rayon and cotton, 
Burlington produced its first synthetic product - a bed- 
spread that was ludicrously crude by all standards.  "it 
didn't wear, it was too shiny; it looked, felt and acted 
cheap."12 Moreover, the bed-spread had another defect; 
it had a seam in the middle because the company's looms 
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were too narrow to weave a bed-spread of normal width. 
Later Love persuaded three local persons to put up $10,000 
each and he himself contributed another $10,000 to Install 
full size looms.  The width of the bed-spreads improved 
thereafter; but other qualities remained the same.  The 
experiment, however, was an investment in the future of 
the corporation and of the textile industry.  It was 
especially an investment in the latter because undeniably 
the greatest advances in the history of the textile in- 
dustry have come with the refinement of synthetic fibers. 
According to American Fabrics magazine, it was "about 
1945 when the man-made fibers began to take on a growing 
importance for textile producers," but by then Burlington 
had devoted over two decades to the synthetics.13 
Burlington Mills' initial success with rayon was 
modest, but its implications were great.  The items manu- 
factured by the company sold mainly because of their low 
prices, but the economic situation in the United States 
and the rest of the "Free World" was deteriorating, so 
that the company could count on the popularity of its 
low-cost goods for some time.  Events did turn out that 
way with the advent of the Great Depression of the late 
1920's and 1930's, and so Burlington earned enough capital 
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and had time to improve the rayon for later markets.  En- 
couraged by its customers' demands, Burlington Mills 
Corporation constructed another plant in 1925; and in 
1927 a plant was built for the production of rayon dress 
goods.  The brick buildings of the corporation's plants 
had one wall made of wood, so that in time of need for 
expansion, the wooden wall could easily be knocked off 
for the addition to the facility.  The business was so 
successful after some time that the question of expansion 
14 was not If but when. 
In the earlier years the company used rayon fibers 
manufactured by Du Pont, the Celanese Corporation, and 
American Viscose.  Burlington used the material to make 
synthetic greige (unfinished) goods for apparel manu- 
facturers.  Throughout the years Burlington diversified 
into many other branches but it kept its original division. 
By 1964, the greige goods market was worth about $500 
million annually, and Burlington had the giant's share 
of it.15 
Setting a Pattern 
Success in the world of American Business requires, 
among other things, careful and extensive planning -- all 
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the more so if a business Is to become the leader in its 
field. While it is hard to say that the Loves had planned 
to do what they did with their original mill, and the 
subsequent set-up in 1923> it is not so difficult to 
assert that after 1927> Burlington Mills planned a course 
for its future.  In 19^1. Spencer Love told John A. Giles, 
"I decided early in life that to get anything done I'd 
have to keep planning."   The basic plan of staying in 
business was always there; modifications were occasionally 
made according to existing conditions.  For instance, 
when the cotton business soured, Love switched to devel- 
oping rayon. 
Once the bright future of rayon was surmised, Love 
built a master plan to expand the operation in order to 
take advantage of opportunities ahead.  The expansion 
program of the corporation had a uniform pattern, with a 
number of elements.  The first element was the wooden 
walls which could be removed easily to add to an existing 
facility.  Often separate facilities were needed, in which 
case more investment was required.  Because the company 
was a new one, it did not always have surplus capital to 
invest lavishly.  So Spencer Love devised a system by 
which money could be borrowed for such purposes: after 
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one of the branches had performed reasonably, he would 
borrow from banks on the strength of the branch's assets. 
Thus, Burlington was able to expand even when its earnings 
seemed to counter-Indicate expansion. 
The second element of the expansion program was 
concerned with acquisitions.  The textile industry in the 
United States has been noted f.or the number and variety 
of its owners. While this characteristic of the industry 
has been on the decline since the nineteen twenties (be- 
cause of keener competition from bigger, more efficient 
producers), the field is still open to families with a 
reasonable capital and a great amount of ambition.  In 
the nineteen twenties the industry was teeming with family 
concerns, but they were ill-equipped to survive unfavorable 
market situations, troubles from organized labor, and 
other similar conditions.  Many of them therefore sold 
out; but while they were selling, Burlington was buying. 
Not all acquisitions of the corporation were made in this 
way, of course.  Sometimes healthy concerns were also 
acquired for mutual benefits. 
The third element in the expansion program of the 
corporation was developed after a little while. That 
element was diversification.  It did not take long for 
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the new corporation to realize the danger of speciali- 
zation in any one branch of textiles.  The textile in- 
dustry always has been a volatile one.  A large company 
operating in a variety of fields can withstand fluctuations 
in particular sectors.  It is highly unlikely that all 
the sectors would make a poor showing at the same time. 
So, Burlington Mills diversified into hosiery, fancy 
dress goods, and the production of all kinds of cotton 
materials, woolens, and the like.  The corporation's 
diversification program is very much alive today as well, 
and has come to cover such fields as furniture, chemicals, 
and computerized time-keeping services. 
But with expansion came the need for more trained 
personnel.  Burlington Mills Corporation was not interested 
in just average people.  Prom the very beginning. Love 
developed a system that can be said to be peculiar to 
Burlington.  This was one aspect of the corporate body 
that Love is regarded as having controlled most thoroughly. 
Spencer Love had begun his executive's career young in life; 
he seemed to have retained the belief that young men, when 
properly trained, turned out to be more productive persons 
than older persons hired with experiences derived from 
working elsewhere.  Love, therefore, hired young people, 
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trained them himself and gave them highly responsible 
positions.  Some of the very top people, for instance, 
J. C. Cowan, Jr., and William A. Klopman, were hired as 
young men and grew with Burlington.  By the time of Love's 
death in 1962 the corporation had several people who 
could take over his responsibilities. 
But there was another reason why Burlington needed 
highly capable persons who were thoroughly versed in the 
corporation's business.  Unlike other large corporations, 
Burlington had several divisions with a large amount of 
autonomy.  The separate divisions have always had to 
manage their own business.  The corporation's head-quarters 
made (and still makes) decisions on broad corporate poli- 
cies only.  Such a structure makes it Imperative that 
division managers know what they are doing.  Since this 
practice is a little different from that found in other 
American corporations, Burlington had to train its own 
personnel; it is common knowledge that younger people are 
easier to educate. ' 
Burlington's expansion program was also conscious 
of quality.  The corporation was conceived at a time of 
troubles between management and labor.  Labor demanded 
higher compensation, while management said that It could 
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not pay better wages because of the bad predicament facing 
the textile industry.  The dispute led to the realization 
among textile manufacturers that more and better machinery 
was needed, if they were to minimize their dependence on 
laborers.  Burlington began its business around this period, 
and so was able to take advantage of this principle.  More- 
over, there was, by this time, the realization that there 
were many Jobs traditionally done by people which could 
be done better by machines.  Burlington grasped the im- 
portance of efficiency, and tried to use up-to-date means. 
However, Spencer Love did not always have the best that 
was available mainly because the corporation could not 
afford both expansion and latest technology.  He was 
hesitant also because of the fact that such a policy would 
have put many people out of work.  Love was a practical 
entrepreneur, but he also had humanitarian strains. 
Once Burlington had entered the synthetics field, 
it was not satisfied to continue using rayon only.  It 
tried to discover newer and better fibers.  In 19^1, when 
the United States put an embargo on silk imports, Love 
was correct in saying that it would not 
inconvenience the American women because rayon, 
nylon and other man-made yarns have been so de- 
veloped in recent years, that on merit alone they 
have been gradually displacing silk.l° 
l6 
Burlington's pattern of development resulted not 
only In benefits for the corporation Itself, but also for 
its competitors.  By the time Love died, the corporation 
had gained the envy of many who tried its ways and bene- 
fitted.  One of the most crucial aspects of the Burlington 
development program (though it could not be said to be a 
pattern in any sense other than that of granting the 
company more independence) was the company's step in taking 
control over the selling of the goods it manufactured. 
This was done by forming a Burlington Sales Company in 
1935.  Traditionally, a textile firm's wares were sold 
by commission houses.  Such a system was detrimental to 
the producer's profits and thus to its development, be- 
cause the producer did not always know how much of what 
material to manufacture.  If his products did not sell, 
he suffered losses, because the commission houses received 
their fixed commission regardless of whether or not manu- 
facturers profited.  Burlington Mills realized the weak- 
ness in such an arrangement and the devastating effect 
it could have on the corporation's future.  Burlington 
had to keep making steady profits or it would stagnate. 
A rapport between the corporation and the consuming public 
had to be effected; Burlington had to know what was going 
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to be in demand and the public had to know what was for 
sale.  The latter may sound paradoxical, but in practice 
it has been working quite successfully.  The concept of 
fashions became really popular in the 1920's, but fashions 
did not just drop down from the sky.  Somehow the tastes 
were first created by enterprising entrepreneurs, who, 
after publicizing the tastes, turned around to take ad- 
vantage of the resulting fad or craze (both are correct). 
Such a system necessitated that textile firms develop 
their own talents for anticipating moods and creating 
fashions to suit them.  As Burlington has seen it, 
success in a fashion industry depends not on 
what the market will bear but on what the mar- 
ket will crave, and this changes swiftly and 
subtly.  To anticipate the changes, even to 
direct them1^ requires a special set of talents 
and skills, and a closeness to the market. 
Commission houses naturally could not be trusted to do the 
job according to Burlington's desires.  Thus, the corpo- 
ration formed its own selling company which has always 
been one of the most vital parts of the Burlington system. 
The fashion industry has grown tremendously since the 
nineteen thirties; a larger number and proportion of 
people today buy clothes with the latest fashion in mind. 
Indeed, the textile industry would not be as profitable 
if textile manufacturers had tried to sell clothes only. 
Burlington's share of the market would not be so substantial 
if it did not keep up with the times. Burlington's own 
sales organization has enabled it to keep up with changes 
in tastes in clothes.  The corporation's slogan "Burling- 
ton is woven into the life of America" has been true 
because the company has known what the life has been 
and is going to be. 
19 
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CHAPTER II 
BURLINGTON GETS FIRMLY ESTABLISHED 
Burlington: 1931-41 
It is well known today that the Great Depression 
which began in 1929 and dragged on into the Second World War 
was a disheartening period for both individuals and busi- 
nesses.  But Burlington Mills not only survived the debacle, 
it actually gained a foothold during the time.  For ex- 
ample, in June, 1933* the Altavista Journal in Virginia 
reported, "Cotton Mill Sold To Love Interest: Plant To Be 
Put In Full Operation Immediately."  While many firms were 
going out of business, Burlington was acquiring and ex- 
panding.  Expansion was almost a superhuman feat for that 
time because credit was almost non-existent. 
Burlington owed its survival and expansion through 
that period mainly to four assets.  First was Spencer Love, 
the shrewd and intelligent administrator, a quiet mannered 
man who carried his cultured heritage into the world of 
business (two seemingly incompatible fields); he therefore 
was neither able nor cared to deal effectively with gullible 
New York converters, whose business consisted of converting 
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the crude rayon fiber produced by Burlington into more 
finished products, sold to those engaged in manufacturing 
finished fabrics.  Love therefore hired William A. Klopman 
as the vice president in charge of New York rayon-greige- 
goods sales.  This second asset of the company, Klopman, 
did a splendid job of persuading the converters to use 
rayon extensively, thus raising Burlington's sales through 
the Depression.  Another asset of the company was the 
rayon fiber, of course.  Known as the "poor man's silk," 
the material was cheap, therefore in demand because poverty 
prevailed at the time.  The last but very important asset 
of the company was its manufacturing executive, John C. 
Cowan, hired in 1931.  Cowan's hard work enabled Burlington 
to manufacture efficiently, steadily and profitably without 
troubles with the corporation's factory employees. 
The growth of Burlington at the time was of im- 
portance not only to the corporation's officers and share- 
holders, who made profits, but to the country in general. 
North Carolina, Tennessee, and Virginia citizens found 
employment at a time when there were few jobs around. 
Moreover, Burlington indirectly employed people in other 
concerns which did business with it.  The corporation's 
factory employees not only gained the basic element of 
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survival, financial security, but worked faithfully to 
keep their jobs which paid higher than those in any other 
textile firm.  The volume of money changing hands because 
of Burlington's being in business was not great compared 
with the United States' gross national product at the 
time, but it was Burlington and its kind which maintained 
people's hopes in the capitalistic system as the one 
best for America. 
Burlington and the free enterprise system compli- 
mented each other from the beginning.  In 1927, the 
company's first rayon goods producing plant went into 
operation.  Sales from the products amounted to $1.8 
million that year.  By 1932, the annual rayon consumption 
had increased to ten million pounds and Burlington had 
twelve plants in North Carolina producing dress materials 
which used a blend of rayon and cotton. The sales that 
year amounted to $15 million. In 1933, the corporation 
produced 60 million yards of the material, employing 
4,000 people.  The same year it raised its employees' 
wages by 15 per cent.  In 193^, Burlington became the 
largest producer of rayon in the United States.  In ad- 
dition, in the same year a merger was effected.  The 
result was that Burlington Mills Company, Incorporated, 
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succeeded to the business of Burlington Mills, Incorporated, 
and five other corporations and of Burlington Mills Company, 
which had been engaged in the same general business since 
various dates after 1923.2 
In 1924, the corporation had begun its involvement 
in the market for synthetic greige goods.  The yarn for 
this purpose was then bought from Celanese Corporation, 
Du Pont, and American Viscose.  In 1935, Burlington Mills, 
under the trade mark of "Bur Mills," had fourteen plants, 
producing a variety of materials that sold for $20 million. 
In the same year, Burlington formed its own Sales Company 
with headquarters in New York.  By then SCpencer Love had 
gained complete confidence in rayon and tried to keep 
expanding.  Borrowing on the assets of already successful 
branches and retaining substantial amounts of the profit 
for investment in new facilities, Love had about thirty 
separate companies by 1937. The total of all sales that 
year was $27,319,509, and net income $715,595- 
In 1937, the companies were merged.  Burlington 
Mills Corporation, Incorporated in Delaware on February 15, 
1937, soon after acquired all assets, property and good 
will of Burlington Mills Company, Incorporated, and 
subsidiaries, Rayon Fabrics Corporation and subsidiaries, 
25 
and Duchess Fabrics Corporation (all of which were North 
Carolina corporations), in exchange for 350,270.8 shares 
of common stock in the new corporation. Rayon Fabrics 
Corporation and Duchess Fabrics Corporation, which had 
commenced business in 1931.. were dissolved.  In 1937, 
the Burlington Mills Corporation stock was also listed 
on the New York Stock Exchange for public sale.  In 
fourteen years Burlington had established itself as a 
stable and profitable business. 
The corporation's expansion program continued. 
On December 31, 1938, Puritan Weaving Company, a wholly- 
owned subsidiary was dissolved and its assets and proper- 
ties were taken over by Burlington Mills Corporation. 
Also in December, 1938, the corporation agreed to acquire 
Cetwick Silk Mills Company of Asheboro, North Carolina. 
The latter was subsequently dissolved, and Burlington 
organized a new wholly-owned subsidiary with the title of 
Cetwick Silk Mills Corporation under the laws of the State 
of North Carolina for the purpose of acquiring properties 
and business of Cetwick company.  On February 6, 1939, 
Burlington acquired E. M. Holt Plaid Mills, Incorporated, 
by exchanging 79,125 of its shares for 5,275 of Plaid 
Mills' common shares; the latter representing the total 
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outstanding stock of the latter company. The properties 
were later merged and Plaid Mills was dissolved. 
In 1939., six more companies were formed as sub- 
sidiaries to engage in the manufacture of women's full 
fashioned hosiery.  Obviously Burlington entered that 
field because it was getting to be a profitable one. 
Then, in December, 19^0, the corporation acquired control 
over Ranlo Manufacturing Company of Gastonia, North Caro- 
lina, and Armco Finishing Corporation of Greensboro, 
North Carolina. 
In 194-1, Town House Hosiery Mills, Incorporated, 
of Chilhowie, Virginia, became a fully-owned subsidiary of 
Burlington Mills Corporation.  In August of the same year, 
the corporation acquired the entire stock of Smithfield 
(Virginia) Manufacturing Company. 
Thus, the corporation was fairly busy during the 
thirties and early forties.  The result was that by 19^1, 
Burlington had forty plants in the three states of North 
Carolina, Virginia and Tennessee. The business was doing 
well and in 194l the corporation's sales amounted to 
$63 million.  By the end of the year the United States 
entered the Second World War, which made Burlington even 
more active. 
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All wars are extraordinary events, Inflating the 
demand for things.  However, certain items experience a 
steadier demand than others.  For instance, steel, petroleum, 
textiles become items of strategic importance.  Of these, 
textiles is the only one that is normally considered un- 
important.  This image of textiles is fostered, no doubt, 
because of its abundance and "common-placeness." (This 
attitude of the public reflects favorably on the textile 
industry of the United States and of the world, because 
it shows that there is at least one indispensable part 
of man's civilization — clothes — which has been de- 
veloped to such a degree that the fear of not having it 
has been almost forgotten.) Wars in general and World 
War II in particular, demonstrated that textiles are 
quite important.  Textile items were needed for many 
purposes.  American textile firms were contracted by the 
Government to supply the items.  Burlington helped the 
country's war effort, and itself, by devoting twenty- 
seven per cent of its operations to Government contracts. 
The military output included items for parachutes, air- 
planes, uniforms, tow targets, raincoats, gun covers, 
and the like.  The corporation made profits, of course, 
and was able to establish itself even more firmly partly 
because of those profits. 
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A comparison between sales and earnings figures 
for the years 1937 to 194l demonstrates the difference 
made by Government contracts. 
Sales and Earnings: .5 
Year Net Sales Net Income 
Earnings on 
Common Shares 
1941 
19^0* 
1939 
1938 
1937 
$63,165,310 
36,805,112 
39,270,505 
27,196,409 
27,319,509 
$3,373,559 
1,716,037 
2,008,311 
1,239,821 
715,595 
$4.87 
2.75 
3.21 
2.27 
1.31 
*Nine months, up to September 28, 1940; other 
fiscal periods (preceding ones only) are calendar years, 
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TABLE 1 
COMPARATIVE CONSOLIDATED INCOME ACCOUNT FOR STATED PERIODS' 
52 weeks to 
Sept. 27,'47 
Net sales $216,960,514 
Cost of sales 159,665,329 
Selling, general & admins, expns 12,969,945 
Depreciation & amortization      3,044,652 
Operating Profit 4l,280,587 
Other income 2,l40,465 
Total income 43,421,052 
Donations 579,134 
Interest expense 527,234 
Other deductions   
Balance 42,314,684 
Federal Income taxes 14,597,055 
Federal excess profit taxes      
State income taxes 2,330,726 
Contingency reserve   
Special credit  
Balance 25,386,903 
Minority interest 499,192 
Provsns. for inventory conting.   1,000,000 
Net profit to surplus 23,887,711 
Earned surplus, beginng. of year 20,448,348 
Other surplus credits 410,490 
Preferred dividends 1,122,309 
Common dividends 5,225,600 
Other surplus debits 1,392,483 
52 weeks to 
Sept. 28,'46 
$141,544,442 
107,645,860 
8,297,245 
1,706,851 
23,894,487 
1,748,581 
25,643,067 
355,079 
462,686 
24,825, 303 
7,389,671 
2,722,428 
1,465,011 
13,248,192 
327,395 
12,920,798 
13,112,026 
145,907 
944,494 
4,046,448 
739,440 
Earned surplus, at year end $37,006,157   $20,448,348 
TABLE 1 - Continued 
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52 weeks to 
Sept. 29,'45 
Net sales $108,199,847 
Cost of sales 85,800,893 
Selling, general & admins, expns 4,982,307 
Depreciation & amortization      1,764,245 
Operating Profit 
Other income 
Total income 
Donations 
Interest expense 
Other deductions 
Balance 
Federal Income taxes 
Federal excess profit taxes 
State income taxes 
Contingency reserve 
Special credit 
Balance 
Minority interest 
Provsns. for inventory conting. 
15,652,399 
305,840 
15,958,239 
619,862 
758,155 
14,580,222 
2,188,465 
6,555,750 
740,788 
5,095,220 
114,491 
52  weeks  to 
Sept.   30,'44 
$93,387,417 
75,057,839 
3,703,912 
1,642,612 
12,983,054 
289,226 
13,272,280 
@ 
704,56O 
264,666 
12,303,055 
2,008,153 
5,860,224 
497,537 
3,937,140 
2,201 
Net profit  to surplus                   4,980,729 3,934,939 
Earned surplus,   beginng.   of year 11,266,649 9,272,458 
Other surplus credits                                246,059 185,597 
Preferred dividends                                     446,019 313,195 
Common dividends                                       2,153,984 I,8l3,l49 
Other surplus  debits 781,409   
Earned surplus,   at year end $13,112,026       $11,266,649 
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TABLE 1 - Continued 
52 weeks to 
Oct. 2,'43 
Net sales $97,641,326 
Cost of sales 80,952,987 
Selling, general & admins, expns 3,742,978 
Depreciation & amortization     1,619,323 
Operating Profit 
Other income 
Total income 
Donations 
Interest expense 
Other deductions 
Balance 
Federal Income taxes 
Federal excess profit taxes 
State income taxes 
Contingency reserve 
Special credit 
Balance 
Minority interest 
Provsns. for inventory conting. 
11,326,038 
142, 582 
11,468,620 
@ 
679,706 
245,914 
10, 543, 000 
1,490,038 
4,802,933 
469, 039 
3,780,990 
2,535 
Net profit to surplus      3,778,457 
Earned surplus, beginng. of year 7,562,986 
Other surplus credits  
Preferred dividends 323,092 
Common dividends 1,745,893 
Other surplus debits   
52 weeks to 
Sept. 26, '42 
$83,096,803 
65,433,786 
3,121,347 
1,408,920 
13,132,749 
80,424 
13,213,173 
@ 
499,234 
377,091 
12,336,848 
1,999,477 
5,423,097 
536,302 
1,000,000 
3,377,972 
5,585 
3,372,388 
5,476,740 
229,472 
1,056,670 
Earned surplus, at year end $9,272,458    $7,562,986 
*Source: Moody's Manual of Investments, 1948, p. 2170. 
@Not stated separately, included in selling, general 
and administrative expenses. 
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Burlington, 1942 - 1952' 
Because the Government's contract with Burlington 
Mills gave the company extra business, it entered 1942 
with added confidence.  The period was a busy one, indeed, 
but Burlington continued its long-term ambitions; acqui- 
sitions and building of new facilities were carried on 
as usual. 
In 1942, Burlington acquired Vamoco Mills of 
Franklinton, North Carolina.  In the same year, the cor- 
poration absorbed minor interests in Robeson Textiles, 
Inc., Russell-Watkins Corp., and McLaurin Hosiery Mills, 
Inc. Subsequently these were acquired completely. 
In November, 1944, Burlington assimilated the 
entire outstanding stock of Harriman Hosiery Mills, of 
Harriman, Tennessee, and in the same year the corporation 
began its foreign ventures.  First a small rayon weaving 
plant in Cuba was purchased.  Then Burlington organized 
Burlington Mills (Australia), Limited, in association 
with business interests in Australia, and operating units 
were also opened in Colombia, South America. 
In 1945, the Company acquired interests in the 
"information in this section is derived from MOODY'S 
MANUAL OF INVESTMENTS, 1944, 1948; unless stated otherwise. 
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following concerns: in July, Sunspun Manufacturing Company, 
of Asheboro, North Carolina; in August, General Ribbon 
Mills, Inc., of New York, and affiliated companies, in- 
cluding Stark Brothers Ribbon Corp., Stark Brothers 
Ribbon Corporation, Ltd., of Canada, and other Stark 
companies; in December, controlling interest in Phenix 
Mills, Inc., Nos. 1 and 2, at Kings Mountain, North 
Carolina.  One of the two Phenix units was sold later on. 
The Corporation also engaged in other activities 
in the same year.  Its foreign operations were further 
expanded.  Burlington purchased a small full fashioned 
hosiery plant in Cuba and acquired an interest in a 
similar plant in Mexico.  Subsequently, broadloom fabric 
was expanded into Canada, through an arrangement with 
Dominion Textile Company, Limited, of Canada. 
The war years were profitable ones for most American 
textile firms.  Surmising their post-war fates, most smaller 
operations tried to sell their businesses when opportunity 
offered.  Burlington was aware of the reason behind 
numerous offers to sell, but still purchased those which 
seemed fairly priced. Burlington itself had done quite 
well during the Second World War, and years following 
immediately.  The corporation's profits between 19^2 
and 1948 were $91 million, of which Burlington retained 
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over $6l million to acquire and operate new properties. 
In August, 19^6, the Corporation bought and es- 
tablished as a new operating division, Cramerton Mills, 
Inc. (North Carolina), manufacturers of fine combed 
cotton fabrics and rayon mixtures.  Two more acquisitions 
were made in the same year.  One, the plants and equip- 
ment of Flint Manufacturing Company of Gastonia, (N.C.) 
were acquired; two, Steele Mills of Rockingham, North 
Carolina were also acquired. 
Since its founding, Burlington had depended on 
converters to keep the business alive by utilizing the 
rayon yarn it produced.  Later, the corporation began some 
converting on its own.  In 19^7 the Company, through its 
sales subsidiary Burlington Mills Corporation (New York), 
acquired a part of the assets of Duplex Fabrics Corpora- 
tion of New York so as to extend activities in converting 
or styling of dress fabrics.  Moreover, the Corporation 
organized a new subsidiary, Duplex Fabrics, Inc., which 
acquired certain assets of Duplex Fabrics of California. 
On December 31, 19^7 Burlington had full voting 
power in the following subsidiaries: Burlington Mills 
Corporation, New York; General Ribbon Mills, Inc.; South 
Boston Weaving Corp., Virginia; Stark Brothers Ribbon 
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Corp.; Stark Brothers Ribbon Corp. of Canada Limited; 
Burlington Mills International Corp..  The Corporation 
also had ninety-seven per cent voting power in Royal Oaks 
Hosiery Mills, Incorporated. 
The corporation also effected changes in the status 
of some of its former subsidiaries between June 12, 19^6 
and December 31* 1948. Those mentioned here were liqui- 
dated and their assets transferred to the company or to 
one or more of its subsidiaries: Sun Spun Sales Corp., 
Sun Spun Manufacturing Co., Inc., Burlington Hosiery 
Sales Co., Inc., Cetwick Silk Mills Corp., Burlington 
Dyeing and Finishing Co., Inc., Steele Manufacturing 
Corp., Vamoco Mills Co., Ranlo Manufacturing Co., Smith- 
field Manufacturing Co., Wadesboro Pull Fashioned Hosiery 
Mills, Inc., Statesville Cotton Mills, Inc., Robeson 
Textiles, Inc., Grayson Full Fashioned Hosiery Mills, 
Inc., Town House Hosiery Mills, Inc., Salem Full Fashioned 
Hosiery Mills, Inc., Randleman Full Fashioned Hosiery 
Mills, Inc., Burlington Mills Hosiery Co., (which was a 
partnership), McLaurin Hosiery Mills, Inc., Russell- 
Watkins Corp., Altown Realty Corp., Sequyta Realty Corp., 
White Sulphur Industries, Inc., South Hill Industries, 
Inc., Harriman Hosiery Mills, and Burlington Textiles 
Factoring and Sales Corp. 
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By January 1, 1948, the Company, its subsidiaries, 
and affiliates operated sixty-one plants in the United 
States.  Forty were located in North Carolina, eleven in 
Virginia, three in Tennessee, one in New Jersey, four in 
Pennsylvania, and two in West Virginia.  At the time the 
Corporation had twelve plants outside of the United States. 
Production machinery at the plants included 11,000 looms, 
475,308 spindles, and 1,632 knitting machines.  With few 
exceptions, properties were owned in fee. 
By December 31, 1948, Burlington Mills Corporation 
was engaged, directly or through subsidiaries, in a variety 
of activities in the textile industry.  It was mainly 
engaged in the manufacture of woven and knitted fabrics 
from rayon, nylon, and other synthetic yarns and combi- 
nations, and to some extent wool and cotton and a combi- 
nation of natural and man-made fibers.  Furthermore, the 
Corporation operated throwing, spinning and dyeing units 
for the production of yarns for its own use and to some 
extent cotton sales yarn.  It also dyed and finished 
cloth on a commission basis.  Burlington by that period 
was merchandising all of its products. 
The principal woven products of the Company in- 
cluded fabrics for dresses, lingerie, linings, suitings 
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for the women's wear trade, which were sold through con- 
verters, and suiting for shirting and sports wear, which 
were sold both directly to manufacturers and through 
converters.  Other woven products included upholstery 
and drapery materials, bedspreads, curtains, and other 
similar fabrics for the home. 
The corporation also manufactured ladies' ful- 
fashioned no-seam hosiery and men's half-hose; and oper- 
ated a nylon throwing plant and hosiery plant in conjunction 
with its hosiery business.  The Company's subsidiaries 
manufactured ribbons and other narrow fabrics.  The busi- 
ness was integrated from purchase, spinning and throwing 
of yarns to finishing of manufactured products and their 
sale and delivery either in finished or greige state. 
Intent on becoming the most outstanding textile 
concern, Burlington continued its expansion.  In July, 
1948, the Company acquired the assets and facilities of 
May McEwen Kaiser Hosiery Company, by issuing 608,000 
common shares. 
On September 13, 19^8, The Greensboro Record re- 
ported that Burlington's President, J. Spencer Love, had 
been appointed by Paul Hoffman, Chairman of the Economic 
Co-operation Administration,  as a representative to aid 
38 
Great Britain in solving her production problems.  Bur- 
lington's success had impressed many people.  With his 
added responsibilities, J. Spencer Love could not conduct 
Burlington's business as usual. 
In December, 1948, Burlington, through its New York 
subsidiary, Burlington Mills Corp., bought the entire 
capital stock of Wheatley Fabrics, Inc., a New York 
textile converting company that sold cloth to the women's 
apparel industry.  Negotiations for the purchase had, 
in fact, gone on long before the actual transaction. 
Other than that, Burlington did not purchase any new 
property until August of 1950, when it acquired a 97 l/2# 
interest in Brighton Mills, Inc.. 
In January 1951, the Corporation purchased Arthur 
Bone, Inc., of Los Angeles, manufacturer, dyer and bleacher 
of worsted yarns.  A year later it acquired stock interest 
in National Mallinson Fabrics Company, and remaining 
minority stockholders were offered Burlington Mills' 
common shares on a share-for-share basis. 
Burlington also acquired another company in May 1952, 
Sarfert Hosiery Mills, Inc., of Philadelphia; and in No- 
vember, 1952, purchased Peerless Wollen Mills for $15,000,04l 
and 421,950 common shares.  Connected with the same 
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transaction the Company exchanged 40,000 of its common 
shares for all the outstanding shares of Peerless Tex- 
tiles, Inc.. 
The decade, 1942-52, experienced a vast growth of 
Burlington Mills Corporation.  The company grew not only 
in size but in quality as well.  By 1952, in comparison 
to 1942, Burlington had spread out and up.  A glance at 
the sales figures^ would best illustrate the difference. 
YEAR SALES 
1952 
1951 
1950 
1949 
1948 
1947 
1946 
1945 
1944 
1943 
1942 
1941 
$ 320,261,452 
310,129,944 
286,970,559 
263,497,942 
288,000,000 
216,960,514 
141,544,442 
108,199,847 
93,387,417 
97,641,326 
83,096,803 
63,165,310 
*1 
#1Ralph Caplan, op_. clt. 
*53 weeks (all others, 52 weeks). 
Burlington, 1953 - 1962* 
The growth of Burlington continued in this period 
of 1953-62 as in former periods.  The pace of the expansion 
*A11 facts in this section, unless otherwise stated, 
are obtained from MOODY'S INDUSTRIAL MANUAL, 1968. 
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plan probably was a little too fast, but Spencer Love 
had always done things rapidly.  He was not a person to 
overlook a reasonable opportunity.  Such opportunities 
were, in fact, plentiful at the time.  Smaller operators 
were coming to realize that the textile industry was 
becoming too efficient and sophisticated for them to 
hang on, so they tried to sell. Naturally they came to 
Burlington, one of the largest, most ambitious, and most 
important, one whose acquisitions king was known for his 
sense of fair play.  Spencer Love's reputation was a 
strong factor in Burlington's success. 
In May, 1953, Burlington Mills, Incorporated 
acquired stock control of Klopman Mills, Incorporated, 
producer of greige textile goods, with plants in Asheboro 
and Ramseur, North Carolina; and, in December of the same 
year, the Corporation purchased assets of Interstate 
Hosiery Mills, Incorporated. 
In July, 1954, Burlington Mills acquired controlling 
interest in Pacific Mills of Boston, Mass., producers of 
worsteds.  The latter was merged with Burlington on 
November 19, 1959.  Then in July, 1954, the corporation 
acquired controlling interest in Goodall-Sanford, Incorpo- 
rated, of Maine.  The newly acquired company wove famous 
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Palm Beach suitings, and manufactured vinyl-coated cloth. 
The company was merged with Burlington on March 28, 1959. 
On February 3> 1955> the name of the corporation 
was changed to Burlington Industries, Incorporated.  In 
the same year the corporation acquired Mooresville Mills, 
of Mooresville, North Carolina, producer of cotton textiles. 
The latter became a division of Burlington after some time, 
specializing in yarn-dyed polyster and cotton fabrics for 
men's women's and children's apparel.  In addition to this, 
the corporation acquired Ely & Walker Dry Goods Company 
of St. Louis, Missouri, in September of 1955-  This company 
had been engaged in the business of manufacturing, con- 
verting and distributing cotton fabrics. 
In 1956, Burlington Industries, Incorporated, 
acquired the entire capital stock of Hess, Goldsmith 
& Company, Incorporated of New York.  This was quite a 
significant purchase, because the Company wove fiberglass, 
with plants at WIlkes-Barre, Taylor and Plymouth, Pennsyl- 
vania; Cedar Grove, New Jersey; and Pomona, California. 
Fiberglass later on came to be used very extensively in 
home furnishings items. 
In August, 1957, Burlington acquired assets of 
Henrietta Mills and Martel Mills Corporation, which pro- 
duced staple cotton fabrics at their plants In the Carolinas. 
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In the following year the corporation acquired New York- 
based selling agents, Catlin Parish Company, and bought 
an 82 per cent interest in Sidney Blumenthal & Company, 
Incorporated. The proportion was later increased to 
96 per cent, and soon thereafter the corporation was 
merged with Burlington in November, 1961.  The year 1959 
saw more than average activity at Burlington.  In that 
year the Adler Company, producer of men's and women's 
sport socks, was acquired, as were Charm Tred Mills, 
Incorporated, manufacturers of tufted man-made fiber and 
blended rugs; Cheraw Weaving Mill, weaver of fancy drapery 
fabrics from man-made fibers; and Ivey Weavers, producers 
of combed-cotton fabrics.  In January, i960, Burlington 
Industries acquired the assets of Princeton Knitting 
Mills, producers of high-pile knitted coatings, liners, 
rugs, and knitted fabrics for underwear, sleepwear, negli- 
gee, dress, sportswear, shoe, and industrial trade.  On 
March 25, I960, the corporation acquired assets and as- 
sumed liabilities of James Lees & Sons Company, in exchange 
for enough common shares (which were not to exceed 2,166,936) 
to entitle Lees' stockholders to receive 2 1/3 (two and one 
third) shares of Burlington's common, for each common share 
held.  The latter was an expensive acquisition, but it 
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brought to Burlington a very profitable division in carpet 
manufacturing. 
In January, 1962, Burlington bought a 90$ interest 
in Erwin Mills, Inc., of Durham, North Carolina, for about 
$23 million.  This company, when acquired, was, and still 
is, a profitable one; it is believed that Erwin Mills' 
acquisition enabled Burlington to surpass the billion 
dollar sales margin In 1962.  Later on Burlington acquired 
the whole of the concern, a development which led to a 
Q 
bout with the Federal Trade Commission. 
The decade 1953-1962 was a busy one for Burlington 
Industries.  It continued its program of expansion through 
growth in existing fields and diversification into others. 
On January 19, 1962, J. Spencer Love completed the 90$ 
acquisition of Erwin Mills, Incorporated.  On the next day 
he was relaxing in Palm Beach, Florida.  While playing his 
favorite game, tennis, he suffered a heart-attack and died. 
He had devoted most of his years to the creation and 
development of Burlington Industries.  His hard work 
played a major role in the company's more than one billion 
dollars worth of sales in the year.  After his death his 
successors continued to add to the enterprise that Love, 
with their help, had guided. 
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TABLE 2 
Important Statistics Relating to the Years,   1952-63 
Cost  and       Operating       Income  Taxes 
Year       Net  Sales       Expenses Profit 
1952 $320,261,452 $301,985,069   $18,276,383 $7,816,103 
1953 360,839,261    335,480,967    25,358,294 11,987,070 
1954 347,493,592    327,072,556    20,421,036 9,615,736 
1955 515,211,961    478,727,477    36,484,214 17,241,684 
1956 636,384,771    601,119,128    35,265,643 15,279,267 
1957 671,191,144    629,698,310    41,492,834 18,062,635 
1958 651,461,056    619,501,086    31,959,970 13,843,526 
1959 805,450,222    742,401,907    63,048,315 29,809,926 
1960 912,988,856    832,908,990    80,079,866 38,421,487 
1961 866,005,244    808,591,158    57,414,086 27,341,146 
1962 1,009,988,856 919,973,262    90,015,109 45,123,459 
1963 1,084,918,643 988,700,815    96,217,828 49,077,616 
Year 
Net        Common     Common Shrs. 
Income     Dividends  Outstanding 
Earnings/ 
Common Shre. 
1952 $8,601,225 $7,130,707 6,654,838 1.09 
1953 10,876,786 4,832,128 7,079,308 1.35 
1954 8,437,345 4,199,075 6,964,161 1.04 
1955 16,369,712 5,111,025 8,139,525 1-83 
1956 15,264,780 8,263,575 8,467,500 1.63 
1957 15,361,802 7,617,122 8,507,3^8 1.64 
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TABLE 2  -  Continued 
Net Common Common Shrs. Earnings/ 
Year Income Dividends Outstanding Common  Shre. 
1958 11,686,895 6,367,336 8,519,691 1.21 
1959 27,642,895 7, 506,335 9,700,832 2.72 
i960 35,432,183 13,149,008 12,140,488 2.81 
1961 24,853,971a 12,086,368 11,968,871 1.99b 
1962 37,465,959 11,942,705 11,957,582 3.04 
1963 40,619,731 14,448,415 12,111,945 3.28 
aBefore  $1,579,898 special debit. 
bAfter special item - net deduction $1.84 
*Source:   Moody's  Industrial  Manual,   1968. 
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The Passing of J. Spencer Love 
When something drastic happens in a publicly held 
American corporation, various speculations are inevitable. 
The "something drastic" may be a significant merger like 
the merger of Hartford Fire Insurance Company with the 
International Telephone and Telegraph Corporation; it may 
be the resignation or death of a key officer of the corpo- 
ration; or it may have a host of other possibilities. 
The nature of the speculations that follow depends mainly 
on two criteria.  One, how great a stake does the public 
have in the corporation?  Two -- in the case of changes 
in key personnel -- what particular personnel changes 
are effected.  Burlington produced a significant degree 
of speculation in 1962.  Although textile firms do not 
attract a great deal of public attention, Burlington 
proved to be an exception because it has been an excep- 
tional company.  In 1962, it directly employed 60,000 
people in the United States.  While the economic reper- 
cussions from its actions would be only mild for the 
country, certain states, notably North Carolina and Vir- 
ginia, could be gravely affected. Textile mills in 1962 
employed, and still employ, people who normally can do 
only farm work besides their mill Jobs; if they were to 
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be let loose upon the job market, they would produce a 
tremendous problem.  Burlington had, besides, been showing 
signs of becoming a corporation like the Celanese Corpo- 
ration.  Such possibilities interest people because of 
investment possibilities and so on.  In addition, Burlington 
attracted speculations from purely curious folks, some of 
whom had become interested in Burlington because of the 
stories they had heard of Spencer Love and who now won- 
dered what would happen to his empire after his death. 
The news of Love's death left Burlington's head- 
quarters in Greensboro in a short-lived confusion.  The 
quandry resulted from a lack of an heir apparent.  The 
question of succession had undoubtedly occurred to people 
before Love's death; but no one, and least of all Love 
himself, had thought of his death at the comparatively 
early age of sixty-five, especially since his father had 
lived to be more than eighty.  Although the absence of a 
previously designated successor made things a little diffi- 
cult, the problem was not as difficult as people had 
supposed at the time, though. The political infighting 
that was expected did not materialize because the capa- 
bilities of Love's lieutenants were little known to out- 
siders.  Working quietly under the shadow of their leader, 
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they had not had a chance to display their administrative 
talents.  It was not that Love had actually tried to 
glamorize his position, but that was how it was taken 
9 
by most outsiders to have been. 
After the death of Burlington's President, the 
need for action on the part of his men became imperative. 
A replacement had to be found.  The crisis disclosed that 
Burlington had a number of highly capable people.  Busi- 
nessmen like John C. Cowan, Jr., Stephen L. Upson, William 
A. Klopman, and Edward Zane, had been Love's associates 
at least since the 1930's and were well acquainted with 
the company's total program.  Still others like Walter 
E. Greer, Herbert M. Kaiser, Henry E. Rauch, Charles F. 
Myers, Jr., Love's associates since the 1940's, knew what 
Burlington's aspirations were.  It was true that perhaps 
no single person could handle as much as Love had handled 
and do an equally good job, but as a group they could 
divide the responsibilities and perhaps even surpass 
Love's performance. 
Soon after Love's death the corporation's Board of 
Directors met in Greensboro, North Carolina, to resolve 
the question of the succession.  The first step the board 
took was to select a nominating committee from among 
themselves.  At first the committee thought of choosing 
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an outsider for the position, but later agreed on Charles 
P. Myers, Jr. to be the President and Chief Executive 
Officer.  Henry E. Rauch was chosen as the working board 
Chairman, to assist Myers. As one member of the nomi- 
nating committee told Seymour Freegood of Fortune Magazine, 
the committee "knew that no single person could replace 
Spencer.  He was one of a kind.  There was a desire for a 
team operation." 
Although it is beyond the scope of this paper to 
offer a detailed study of Spencer Love, it would perhaps 
be well to allude to certain aspects of his personality 
which had a direct bearing on Burlington as a textile 
firm.  For one, Love was an adventurous person, not afraid 
of innovation.  In 1919* when he bought the old mill in 
Gastonia, he was taking a bold risk.  In 1923, when his 
new company had an unhappy experience with cotton manu- 
facturing, he diverted the energies of the company towards 
manufacturing and developing rayon.  That was exploration 
into a largely new territory.  Even so, his adventures 
and explorations were not as reckless as people have 
often supposed.  Most journalists11 who wrote about him, 
either openly wrote that he was a gambler or implied that 
he took a great risk in starting his business.  But Love's 
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adventure was founded on the knowledge that a textile 
operation was a very good possibility.  There were numerous 
operations not only in North Carolina but in the United 
States at large. He was going to start off in the same 
manner as the Cones of Greensboro had begun, by investing 
at first on a small scale and then building up rapidly 
into a bigger business.  DCuring his novitiate as pay- 
master, he had seen a textile mill in operation.  His 
explorations into the possibilities of rayon was based on 
a knowledge of the history of the fiber. Rayon had been 
manufactured commercially since 1891.  Its quality was 
not competitive for a normal and healthy period, but it 
could keep the company from bankruptcy for some years. 
And within that period, if the quality of the fiber did 
not improve or if the cotton situation was bettered, the 
company could make adjustments.  But the quality of rayon 
as a fiber was bound to improve.  This was so because 
researches were being done in the field by reliable corpo- 
rations, like American Viscose, Celanese Corporation, 
and E.I. du Pont de Nemours and Co.. In Love's judgement 
therefore, rayon could only improve in quality.  It did 
indeed improve, and Burlington gained because of it. 
The second aspect of his character which had a 
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direct bearing on Burlington was Love's sheer industrlous- 
ness.  He was known to work about eighteen hours per day, 
seven days a week.  He had a tremendous responsibility 
within the corporation, and accepted, besides, numerous 
public, civic, and educational duties as well, so that 
such long hours were imperative.  Interwoven with this 
quality was his life-long habit of moving swiftly.  As 
we have seen, just after his University life, he went 
into the army.  Returning from the army, he was not satis- 
fied to spend a normal length of time looking for a job. 
In early 1919, if he had stayed in Cambridge, he might 
have found a position, but he was too impatient with 
such delays; so he went to North Carolina where he promptly 
won a very modest position for a man of his qualifications 
and aspirations.  That however, was better for Love than 
waiting.  Within about six months he made up his mind to 
begin a textile venture of his own, and went ahead with 
his plans.  In the 1950's he purchased one firm after 
another.  No doubt he often outdid his rivals in the 
business merely because of his extraordinary pace, 
one observer remarked, 
It was like watching the Indian rope trick . 
One minute Spencer was standing there with 
nothing in his pocket but that one hocked 
cotton mill in North Carolina.  The next 
As 
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he was climbing so fast he was practically out 
of sight.12 
Through his hard work he found out about new opportunities 
and then acted without delay. 
Spencer Love was also very well versed in the 
American System, a point on which he was not well under- 
stood by the public.  Probably those who wrote about him 
chose not to query him on the matter because of the fear 
that his explanation might have diverged from the folk 
myth about rugged individualism.  Or perhaps the writers 
themselves were not aware that the question was worth 
asking.  But Love tried to explain whenever he had an 
opportunity.  One such occasion on which he tried to tell 
a writer that it was the efforts and co-operation of a 
number of people that led to the success of the corporation, 
was in the interview given to John A. Giles in September, 
1941. Love is quoted as saying, 
We just got a damn good bunch of people together 
who have always pulled together with one purpose 
[success] in mind.13 
He also said very plainly that the superman myth 
was not well-founded.  The remark was not made with reverse 
psychology in mind; for his personal accomplishments were 
well known.  But Love knew better than outside enthusiasts 
how the business had been begun and expanded.  Bankers' 
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foresight in granting loans was openly appreciated, con- 
verters were given credit for using rayon liberally at a 
time when the material was little known to the public, 
and, above all, the loyalty and hard work of the company's 
personnel was fully acknowledged.  Spencer Love had a 
sense of truthfulness about such matters because he knew 
that he was only giving the facts. 
This is not to imply though, that he did not take 
pride in his own role.  After all it was he who had orga- 
nized the Burlington system.  It was his untiring industry 
that had converted Burlington from a small concern peddling 
"poor man's silk" into a vast network engaged in every 
branch of the textiles.  He was an exceptional man in 
almost every respect and had set a high goal for himself 
since his youth.  Without self-delusion, he accepted the 
important role he had played and was proud of his accom- 
plishments.  But he was too much of a realist to put much 
credence in the miraculous powers of the conventional idea 
of individualism.  He was a strong believer in competition 
and encouraged it vigorously in the corporation, with the 
result that many of his colleagues were embittered, while 
others appreciated the goals for which he was striving, 
and they benefited from it.  The individual competition 
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was not just a haphazard exercise, though.  It required a 
great amount of understanding and co-operation among indi- 
viduals if it was to be successful.  In such a system, a 
purely individualistic person could easily come to grief. 
One had to realize the importance of reciprocity between 
the individual and the organization.  Love's kind of indi- 
vidualism made a person efficient without destroying his 
uniqueness as an individual.  He himself was an excellent 
example of his preachings. 
Spencer Love's magnanimity was well known, even 
though he often ran into disfavor with his colleagues 
over one of his policies.  It was his practice to use the 
Executive Committee partly as an educational body.  He 
would put his newly acquired young men on it so that he 
could train them himself.  Those who met his very high 
standards were given important positions.  Then came the 
real test, for Love was a ruthless taskmaster.  He demanded 
results, not excuses.  If good results were not promptly 
forthcoming, the person's position at the corporation was 
terminated.  Many junior executives in the mid-fifties 
fell short of his expectations and were duly removed. 
Naturally they had little love for their former chief 
in their later life. 14 
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It was, however, not the discarded who were the 
bitterest; rather, it was the senior executives who had 
been criticized by their juniors.  Once the seniors 
heard the "news", they were often obliged to reply in a 
similar manner.  The result was that the boss ended up 
having the complete story while the others had only their 
own side of it.  Far from discouraging such unconventional 
and forthright behavior, Spencer Love encouraged it.  The 
system kept all employees on their toes, and the corpo- 
ration gained because every one felt driven to do his 
best.  This was one of the reasons why older officers 
disliked his practice of hiring young people for impor- 
tant positions. 
The second reason for hard feelings on the part of 
many was somewhat less directly connected with the C ompany. 
In the American system, it is considered normal for young 
people to begin from the bottom and work themselves up. 
The custom is often used by those in upper echelons to 
satisfy their former frustrations and disappointments by 
punishing the beginners.  The result of the whole ritual 
is that by the time the younger person gains the aimed-for 
position, he has expended most of his energies.  Filled 
with bitterness, he applies the same strategy to the 
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next younger group, and so the vicious circle continues. 
The custom has become so ingrained that a departure from 
it is considered un-American.  (One can sometimes by-pass 
the system, though, if one has extraordinary talents or 
important connections). 
Spencer Love was a man well-known for ignoring 
shibboleths.  He also had a first-hand experience of what 
the particular shibboleth meant for a highly intelligent 
and ambitious person.  He had encountered it himself in 
his initial confrontation with the business world.  But 
his response to the practice was different from the ordi- 
nary, once he became what he had wanted to be.  Instead of 
trying to break the spirit of the young people who came to 
him for employment, he gave them a chance.  Many failed 
the challenge, but they could hardly blame Love for their 
failure.  Those who made it, of course, were grateful. 
Spencer Love's aims were not always well appreciated. 
Many no doubt thought that he was simply trying to give a 
youthful image to the company.15 It is rather interesting 
to note that such a view would be held, in spite of the 
fact that Love never tried to build any kind of an image 
for the sake of an image.16  He just did not see any good 
reason in abiding, say, by Andrew Carnegie's way of doing 
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things when his own methods would be better for Burlington. 
Incidentally, after Love's death, the practice was done 
away with and now Burlington often finds it necessary to 
acquire people from the outside to fill important vacan- 
cies.  Burlington has therefore become a more conventional 
American corporation. 
Love had a number of responsibilities.  The public 
often wondered how he managed to keep up with the details 
of all his enterprises.  He was a highly organized man. 
He planned all his activities, and kept track of the de- 
tails with the help of his famous "pen notes."  He hardly 
ever talked about Burlington's affairs; he exchanged 
information in the written form.  He had several secretaries 
and often sent memoranda to his colleagues, and the more he 
dispatched the more he received.  By working fast and long 
hours he managed to keep up with his work.  His juniors 
were amazed that their chief was so efficient; and he was 
hardly ever late for an appointment. Whenever he was, he 
would humbly apologize to the waiting party, a courtesy 
extended no less to his secretaries than to major officers. 
He was a good Presbyterian.  With all his money 
another might have behaved very differently.  But Spencer 
Love's favorite indulgence was a quick milk-shake at the 
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nearest drug-store even in a diverting city like New York. 
In appearance he was just as simple, and if one did not 
happen to notice that he would get out of the soda-shop to 
jump into a waiting limousine, one would not even be aware 
of the fact that the person he had just passed on the 
street was an outstanding industrialist. Love's modesty 
and good manners astounded those who happened to meet him. 
Although he remained a somewhat shy public speaker all 
his life, he was also known to be a formidable person if 
he had reason to be annoyed.  Like most efficient people 
he had difficulty understanding as to why his subordinates 
failed to do what seemed so elementary to him.  Jacob Hay 
wrote, 
Although it is reported by those who have under- 
gone the dreadful experience that he is capable 
of dealing out some of the finest tongue-lashings 
to be heard in the western hemisphere, his manner 
towards his associates and subordinates usually 
combines urbane courtesy with humility and con- 
sideration. 
Naturally many of those who had experienced the sting of 
his exasperation remember him only by their unhappy en- 
counter.  More reasonable people generally minimized the 
bad encounters and remembered him for the better ones. 
Their conclusion was the same as that of most other 
people's: Spencer Love was an able, honest, sincere, 
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hard-working, shrewd businessman; a kind family man; a 
good friend; a very decent private individual.  He was 
one successful business tycoon who came closest to being 
a truly good man, in the loftiest sense of that term. 
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CHAPTER III 
BURLINGTON SINCE 1962 
The New Administration 
After Spencer Love's death, Burlington's Board of 
Director's found itself with the responsibility of choosing 
a new leader.  As already mentioned, Charles F. Myers, Jr., 
was agreed upon as the new President, and Henry E. Rauch 
his assistant, as working board Chairman.  The new ad- 
ministration was a signal for change not only because of 
the change in its structure (the two above-mentioned 
positions were previously held by Love alone), but because 
different people were more likely to have a different 
temperament than Love.  Besides, the successors were 
primarily specialists in corporate finance, whereas Love 
had been primarily an administrator. 
Charles P. Myers, Jr., is a person vastly different 
in temperament from his predecessor.  He is a native-born 
Southerner who graduated from Davidson College in North 
Carolina and from the Harvard University School of Busi- 
ness, and was in the banking business in New York and the 
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South before joining Burlington in 19^7.  Myers is an 
urbane man who likes to work closely with people in a 
relaxed yet firm manner.  Moreover, he does not have as 
many details to cope with, so that Love's method of working 
by memoranda has largely been done away with.  Also, Myers 
prefers not to concern himself with small details.  Such 
matters are left to his juniors. 
The major similarity between Charles F. Myers, Jr. 
and his predecessor of course, is that the new President 
is as much concerned with the welfare of the corporation 
as Love was.  Like Love, Myers works hard to keep a strict 
control over the numerous activities of the Company.  It 
was done by way of a Management Committee chaired by 
himself and made up of Henry E. Rauch and seven other 
most senior officers, each responsible for a group of 
divisions whose Presidents reported to them and whose 
operations they discussed at frequent meetings in the 
corporation's offices at Greensboro or New York.* However, 
Myers is, as observed by one of the members of the committee, 
more patient than Love, more willing to prolong 
discussion.  Spencer was quick and brought 
*In 1969 Henry Rauch vacated his seat by becoming 
the Chairman of the newly formed Finance Committee charged 
with looking after the corporation's financial policy 
and direction. 
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things to a head quickly. Also, we've got team- 
work now.  We arrive at decisions jointly.  Charlie 
is firm but he doesn't start out knowing all the 
answers. 
Soon after becoming President, Myers changed the 
composition and duties of the Management Committee.  Under 
Love, it was a rotating body which had younger executives 
to give the juniors a sense of the broad sweep of Burling- 
ton's operations.  Myers diminished the role of the 
younger men in top management by replacing them on the 
committee with several of their elders like William G. 
Lord, President of Galey & Lord, one of the Corporation's 
most profitable divisions and Prank H. Leslie, responsible 
for Burlington's cotton and synthetic greige-goods sales. 
Myers explained the reason for the change "at the time of 
transition I wanted to be able to call on our senior 
merchants."2 The reason was quite ambiguous, of course, 
for it was unclear how not having them on the committee 
could hinder the communications.  One suspects that Love's 
system in this instance was not very popular with his 
successors. 
Myers, of course, has always appreciated the availa- 
bility of young persons trained by Love.  In 1964, almost 
thirty-five of Burlington's seventy top manufacturing and 
sales executives were in their thirties or early forties 
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and there were twelve more In top posts.  Charles Myers, Jr., 
however, terminated Spencer Love's system of preparing 
young executives for Important posts by having them serve 
as his assistants; neither has he turned to the younger 
executives for advice.  In 1964, Seymour Preegood wrote, 
quoting one of the founder's old associates, "in Spencer's 
time Burlington was on a youth kick that sometimes got out 
of hand."   Under Myers the educational aspect of the 
Committee was completely removed, and it has continued 
to be a body primarily concerned with operations. 
The new team effected other changes. Between 1950 
and 1962, Love invested $284 million in cash and stocks 
to acquire seven large and several smaller concerns. Be- 
tween January, 1962 (excluding Erwin Mills acquired by 
Love a day before his death), and June, 1964, Burlington 
acquired only a substantial interest in Stoffel, A.G., a 
Swiss manufacturer of high-quality combed cotton and 
synthetic blended fabrics with annual sales of $14 million. 
The acquisition was made with the intention of expanding 
Burlington's share in the European market, and the result 
proved to be good.  During the same period the Corporation 
did not acquire any additional domestic corporations.  The 
reasons were obvious, for one, during the last twelve years 
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of his career, Love had already acquired a large number of 
the better ones. Second, the anti-trust division of the 
Federal Government was fearful that Burlington might 
acquire too large a part of the American market.  Third, 
during the latter part of Love's reign, the company had 
acquired too much too fast so that there was neither 
time nor money to modernize older types of operations. 
It was natural that the new management, therefore, 
should try to make such needed changes. A thorough pro- 
gram of internal expansion and modernization was under- 
taken by the corporation in the years immediately following 
Love's death.  The suggestion here is not that had Spencer 
Love lived, these changes would not have been made; the 
present writer's guess is that he would have slowed down 
on the acquisitions and concentrated on internal expansion 
and improvement.  Even if he tried to continue expanding 
through acquisitions, the Federal Government might have 
asked him to halt. This view is founded on the realization 
that internal expansion and modernization were logical 
products of rapid and numerous acquisitions.  Without the 
acquisitions, Internal expansion would have been too 
limited; without the internal expansion and improvement 
at that time, the business would have suffered. 
I 
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The new team, therefore, has been concentrating on 
these aspects.  Internal expansion and plant modernization 
have been no easy tasks, though.  In terms of capital 
outlay, they have become very costly.  Spencer Love spent 
$177 million on modernization between 1959 and his last 
acquisition, and a part of this amount went into acqui- 
sitions. But between February, 1962, and the end of the 
corporation's 1964 fiscal year, Burlington spent $153 
million on additions and improvements to existing facili- 
ties. The new team explained its change in policy: 
Through internal expansion we can concentrate 
on profit improvement in areas where we already 
have a strong position and proven management, 
rather than tackling the unknowns that come 
with acquisitions. 
Both Myers and Rauch had been finance people under Love, 
so that their preoccupation with healthy profits was 
understandable. Since 1964, the new team's emphasis has 
been on internal expansion and plant improvement in the 
United States and acquisitions in overseas countries, 
especially in Europe. The only substantial domestic 
acquisitions have been in furniture manufacturing. 
The financial background of the new chiefs had 
other repercussions. They also changed the company's 
balance sheet. Until the end of 1962 Burlington had four 
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issues of preferred stock in addition to the common.  By 
borrowing $25 million in subordinated debentures, the 
corporation paid off the preferred stocks. That saved 
Burlington about $4 million over the life of the pre- 
ferred stocks.  As Myers explained it, 
It made sense to convert to debt.  The money 
market was fairly free and we were able to bor- 
row on a subordinated basis instead of a senior 
debt basis. This ability reflected the im- 
proving status of the company. 
In a similar attempt to impress the financial com- 
munity further, the new team has been trying to pay its 
stockholders a healthier dividend. At the end of fiscal 
1962, the Company's sales amounted to $1,084,919,000. 
The net profit in 1963 was $40,620,000, representing a 
return of 10.5$ on shareholders' equity. In the same 
year J.P. Stevens, Burlington's closest publicly-held 
competitor, paid 5-3& and the textile industry as a whole 
averaged 6%.    During the last five years of Love's admini- 
stration, the highest return on the stockholders' equity 
was 9.8$.  But Love's last acquisition, Erwin Mills, was a 
good one in terms of profits, and was partly responsible 
for higher profits afterwards. 
Burlington has always been noted for its strong 
Research and Development programs.  The corporation has 
had Research and Development centers at its divisions since 
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the very early days, but in 1959, Burlington began a 
program of central research at its laboratory located in 
Greensboro, N.C.  The central laboratory concentrated its 
efforts on matters not covered by the divisions, but it 
was not until about the end of 1963 that the various 
activities at the Corporation's divisional laboratories 
were co-ordinated.  Also, certain changes in the activities 
of the central laboratory were effected. The previous 
efforts at the corporate research laboratory were devoted 
to near-term research such as proper dyeing methods. 
The IVfyers administration began the reorganization 
of Burlington's Research and Development program by 
appointing a vice president in the person of George E. 
Norman, Jr., to oversee the centrally co-ordinating effort. 
Norman expanded the central laboratory's research library 
to include a technical information service that stored, 
retrieved, and communicated all pertinent Information to 
about three hundred persons working in about twenty-five 
divisional laboratories.  Simultaneously, the central lab 
began long-range research on such problems as the adhesive 
characteristics of polymers and elastomers.  With the 
increased duties of the central laboratory, the number 
and quality of its technicians were increased. The 
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number increased from fifty-five in 1962 to seventy-five 
in 1964. 
As a result of the change in outlook and purpose, 
the costs went up.  In the 1964 fiscal year the company 
spent $12 million (a very large sum by any standard) on 
broad research and development, which included product 
development and quality control work. Between 1962 and 
1964, it annually spent about one per cent of its sales 
on research and development programs.  In the mid-sixties 
it continued this policy, which ranked about ten times 
the proportion spent by the textile industry as a whole. 
Recently many other companies have begun investing gener- 
ously in this aspect of their operation so that Burlington's 
average has declined relatively. 
In order to keep up its Research and Development 
works, Burlington planned a new Research Center in 1964. 
Its construction began on October 1, 1965; it was completed 
on May 1, 1967.  A very impressive facility, the Center's 
three main areas had a total floor space of 100,000 square 
feet, and fully equipped, it represented an investment of 
more than $3.5 million.  The furnishings such as carpets, 
furniture upholstery, curtains, were manufactured by 
Burlington itself, of course.  Located beside Interstate 
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Highway 40 at Guilford College-Jamestown Road (Guilford 
County, North Carolina), the Research Center housed many 
highly specialized laboratories in which scientists and 
technicians of various disciplines pursued long and short 
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range activities.  Some of the activities were these: 
Dyeing: Advanced techniques for the application of dyes to 
all fibers were developed.  The technology of computer 
control in improving uniformity in color was used extensively. 
Finishing: Fabrics with new and improved properties were 
created. The properties included wash and wear, durable 
press, soil release, water repellency, decreased flamma- 
bility.  A pilot plant for dyeing and finishing applications 
was also located at the Center. 
Polymers: Polymers were made to give fabrics functional 
properties such as durable press and anti-static qualities. 
Electronics: Advanced electronics devices for measuring 
and controlling the performance of processing equipment 
were designed and produced. 
Fiber Development: Researches were done in the areas of 
fiber dynamics associated with conventional and non- 
conventional spinning throwing concepts.  Also included 
were studies of new and chemically or mechanically modified 
fibers and the exploration of extrusion techniques for the 
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conversion of polymers into yarn and fabric structures. 
Composite Structures: Research on the assembly of materials, 
adhesives, and coatings to form useful new products of 
importance to Burlington's textiles, plastics and furni- 
ture operations were done.  A related area was concerned 
with increasing the value of Burlington's textile waste 
for re-use or for sale to other industries. 
High Speed Photography: Time magnification of operations 
filmed at high speed was used to reveal the many normally 
hidden aspects of textile processes and processing equipment, 
Pollution Control: Effort was made to develop and implement 
procedures for the control of water and air pollution. 
The procedures included the development of new analytical 
techniques for the measuring of contaminants, improving 
manufacturing processes, and the devising of new mechanisms 
for effluent purification. 
Technical Information: An excellent technical library was 
housed in the Center.  Technical information services 
were provided to the scientists and technicians at the 
Center and the divisions.  Moreover, an information storage 
and retrieval network for internal technical reports and 
for the published literature was provided. 
Obviously, a great deal of work was done at the 
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Center.     As Myers had said, 
We want to search out the best talent,   to go on 
discovering and employing the most efficient 
techniques to make the finest textile product 
possible.' 
Alas,   the ambitious program did not succeed.     In its 
1972  Annual  Report,   the  company  reported  that  the  central 
research  facility was  sold.     The  reason  given  for  it was 
"Analysis   of past  research programs  indicated  that  divisional 
product  development,   keyed  to specific market  and production 
requirements,   had been more effective.    As a result,   di- 
visional research programs are being expanded."'     The 
central  staff was  reduced  and relocated in  Greensboro. 
Generally  speaking,   the new team has  done  quite 
well.     Specifically,   it   improved Burlington's  overall 
operations through internal innovations,   thus  increasing 
the effectiveness of existing facilities.     It also improved 
the profits  to stockholders,   except for few years when the 
bad condition of the general economy prevented it.     Both 
1967 and 1971 were such years;   all others have been good. 
In 1968 the  Company's Annual Report declared, 
Since 1962,   when sales  first reached the billion- 
dollar  level,   the  company  has  based  its  policy 
for  profitable  growth on   (l)   the most  efficient 
use  of  existing  facilities,   (2)   internal  expansion 
through  substantial  capital  investment  for plant 
and  equipment,   (3)   new expansion  in markets 
abroad,   and  (4)   diversification   into non-textile 
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areas in which Burlington's management, marketing 
and production abilities can be used effectively." 
This is still the general plan that the Company follows. 
Expansion Through Acquisitions: 1963 - 1972 
In January, 1963, Burlington subsidiary, Klopman 
Mills, Incorporated, acquired Fabrex Corporation, a New 
York textile manufacturer, for $5.4 million.  In October 
of the same year the company acquired a substantial interest 
in Stoffel AG, St. Gallen, Switzerland.  The Swiss textile 
manufacturer had five plants in Switzerland, all of which 
became wholly-owned properties of Burlington Industries, 
in 1967. 
In March, 1965, the corporation acquired Tricotex 
Company, of Sherbrooke, Quebec, producer of warp knitted 
piece goods from synthetic yarns. 
In May, 1966, Burlington entered a new field, furni- 
ture, by acquiring Globe Furniture Company of High Point, 
North Carolina, manufacturers of upholstered furniture and 
occasional tables.  Burlington had, in fact, manufactured 
and handled home furnishings items such as curtains, 
covers for furniture, and fiber-glass insulations, so that 
*A11 facts in this section are derived from MOODY'S 
INDUSTRIAL MANUAL, 1971, unless stated otherwise. 
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the field was not completely alien. 
In February of 1968, Burlington acquired a majority 
interest in Schappe, A.G., of Basel, Switzerland, producer 
of texturized and spun yarns for weaving and knitting, 
and knit dresses and fabrics for apparel.  The acquired 
concern had plants also in France, Germany, Spain, Sweden, 
and the United Kingdom. 
In December, 1968, Burlington acquired United Furni- 
ture Company, in Lexington, North Carolina. The furniture 
operation which was taken on in 1966  had no doubt pro- 
duced good results so that more effort was expended in 
the field. 
In late 1969, Burlington Industries, Incorporated, 
acquired 80$ interest in Gladbacher Woolindustries A.G., 
of West Germany.  Another 18.9^ interest in the same 
company was acquired in April, 1970, through a tender 
offer, an offer made by Burlington to buy, and accepted 
by the acquired company.  The acquired concern produced 
worsteds and worsted blend fabrics for clothing; car- 
peting for home, institutional and commercial uses. 
In 1970, Burlington absorbed its division, Adler, 
and Erwin Mills, Inc., a subsidiary, and then in August 
of 1970 the corporation acquired the assets of Stendig, 
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Inc., importers of contemporary furniture for contract 
market. 
In 1972, the Corporation acquired National Upholstery 
Company of High Point, North Carolina, and its subsidiaries 
for 140,735 shares of common stock in a pooling of in- 
terests transaction.  Burlington's success in the furni- 
ture business prompted the purchase. 
Burlington as of December, 1972 
Burlington continued its leadership position in 
textiles in 1972.  The company's Annual Report mentioned 
with satisfaction that the year was a better one than 
the disappointing 1971. The earnings on the common share 
were $1.86, 22.4$ higher than the $1.52 earnings per share 
in 1971; and the sales of $1.8 billion were 5-2$ higher 
than the $1.7 billion in 1971.  Moreover, the net earnings 
of $49,607,000 were 23-6$ higher than $40,l4l,000 in 1971. 
Thus, while Burlington did not perform too well compared 
with many other types of businesses, it did do quite well 
for a textile concern. 
Several factors contributed to the improvement.  Some 
*A11 facts in this section are derived from Burlington 
Industries, 19J2 An™*! Report, unless mentioned otherwise. 
1 
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of these were those that helped businesses in general, 
others were peculiar to Burlington.  An upswing in the 
general economy helped most businesses, just as the new 
investment tax credit helped the net earnings of most 
corporations.  These helped Burlington too, of course. 
Moreover, a resurgence of markets for certain types of 
apparel fabrics helped textile manufacturers who produced 
such fabrics.  Burlington also gained from growth in the 
home furnishings area where it has always excelled.  But 
the company gained most from changes it had initiated 
since 1970.  Foresight, based on extensive research there- 
fore, played the major role in improving Burlington's 
profits in 1972.  For example, in 1970 the sales from 
knit and stretch woven apparel fabrics amounted to only 
$93 million, but the company foresaw the soaring demand 
of these products in the near future.  It accordingly 
diverted extra energies in this area and the 1972 sales 
amounted to $271 million. 
A similar increase was also experienced in the sales 
of home furnishings products.  Constituting about one 
third of the 1972 sales, the home furnishings division 
brought in $592 million, an increase of about 180 over 
1971 and 31* over 1970.  Because this division is expected 
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to continue doing well,   two more furniture operations were 
begun in 1972,   and a third plant was converted to the 
manufacture of furniture.     Still another plant was  com- 
pletely re-equipped  to dye,   finish  and print products 
in  Burlington's  home  furnishings  area.     Moreover,   towels 
and blankets were added to the domestics department. 
The changes  in the corporation's production direction 
were accomplished without the construction  of new plants. 
This was  of  course  possible  because  of  the  large  number  of 
plants the company possessed.     The existing facilities 
were  converted to accomodate  the new  or  expanded  depart- 
ments,   while  some  small  operations  which did not  fit   into 
Burlington's  overall  plans  were  sold  or  closed.     Burling- 
ton's ability and willingness to shift emphasis according 
to the prevailing conditions continue to enable it to be 
in the forefront in the textile industry.     A shift in 
emphasis  entails  accelerated and even   extensive  conversion 
of existing plants to new product lines,   and the latter 
involves  money.     Although  the  effect   is  therefore a  re- 
duction  in  the net  earnings,   the  change  enables  the  corpo- 
ration  to do  better  in   the  future,   so  that  the  expenditure 
is  justified. 
A  clearer picture  of  the  corporation  in   1972  can  be 
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had by a closer look at its operations during the year. 
The following attempts to do this: 
Products for Apparel 
Sales Percentage of total sales 
1972    $1,138 million 
1971    $1,150 million 
62.7 
66.6 
The company's products for the apparel markets include a 
wide variety of woven and knitted fabrics, yarns, and men's 
and women's hosiery. 
Products for the Home 
Percentage of total sales Sales 
1972 
1971 
$592 million 
$503 million 
32.6 
29.1 
The division is made up of plants manufacturing 
carpets and rugs, sheets and pillowcases, blankets, towels, 
draperies, drapery fabrics, upholstery fabrics, mattress 
ticking and furniture. 
Products for Industry 
Sales Percentage of total sales 
1972    $86 million 
1971    $74 million 
4.7 
4.3 
Burlington produces a wide range of fabrics and yarns 
for industrial uses.  These products experienced a strong 
and continuing demand through 1972.  Fiber glass products 
and fabrics for the tire and other rubber products industries 
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were  especially  strong.     New products  Included protective 
fabrics  for law enforcement agencies and consumer safety 
products. 
In  August,   1972,   the  corporation  sold  its  Goodall 
Vinyl division,   which had an average annual sales rate  of 
$12 million.     The division was sold because its "product 
lines and markets were not compatible with Burlington's 
primary industrial business."    The corporation hoped to 
better the  output  of products  for  industrial uses  through 
expansion   of   its  existing production  and development 
of new products. 
Raw Materials  Usage 
The  corporation uses  numerous  types  of  fibers   in 
the production  of its textile goods.    The following major 
fiber  categories were used  in  1972: 
Man-made:      75$  (76$  in  1971) 
Cotton: 190 (170 in 1971) 
Wool: 60 (  70 in 1971) 
The analysis shows fiber content based on the value of 
the  fiber used,   and  non-fiber materials  have been  excluded. 
The  price  of  raw cotton was higher during most  of 
1972,   but   in  the  latter part  of Burlington's  fiscal  year  - 
which runs   from  October 1  through  September 30  --  the prices 
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declined because of larger crops. The prices of most 
man-made fibers were stable or a little higher during 
1972. The only exception was filament polyester, whose 
prices declined significantly.  Raw wool prices, very 
low in 1971, increased substantially in 1972. 
International Operations 
Burlington's consolidated international operations 
brought in sales amounting to $210 million in 1972.  The 
1971 sales of these operations were $177 million.  However, 
the increase did not accurately reflect the state of the 
operations because in 1972 Burlington suffered a loss of 
$3.9 million in this sector, while the 1971 loss was 
$3.8 million.  Most of the international operations were 
successful, though, and those which suffered losses 
faced an adverse market. With their poor operating 
conditions they could not cope with unfavorable situations. 
Burlington has moved to amend the weaknesses in its 
international branches, so that the 1973 outlook seemed 
better.  Moreover, in 1972 the textured yarn markets in 
the world were drastically depressed owing to overcapacity 
of production, but this also showed signs of changing for 
the better.  Meanwhile the corporation took action to 
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balance product  lines  of International divisions to market 
conditions,   and  to  reduce  costs  and  increase manufacturing 
efficiencies.     By  December  1972,   two  important  operations 
had completed start-up phases and were running well.     Thus, 
with better market  conditions,   its  international sector 
should do better in 1973- 
Export  Operations 
The  corporation's  export  sales  from the United 
States increased in  1972 to $52 million.     The 1971 sales 
were  $32 million.     Burlington  emphasizes  export  of products 
manufactured  by  the  corporation's United States  divisions. 
Burlington  was  also  engaged  in  other  fields  related 
to  its  business.     Most   important  of  these are  discussed 
below. 
Advertising  and  Promotion 
The  corporation  spent   $15 million   for  these purposes 
in  1972,   compared to $17 million  in 1971.     The 1973 budget 
set  aside  $16 million  for the  activities.     The  company's 
advertising  campaign  succeeded  in   increasing  consumer 
awareness  mainly  through  its  utilization  of prime-time 
network  television,   that   is,   television advertisement 
during early  evening. 
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Burlington  spends  heavily  on  advertising  its  brand 
name consumer products.     These include Burlington House 
(home  furnishings),   Burlington  Hosiery,   Burlington  Socks, 
Lees Carpets,   and Burlington and Klopman  fabrics for home 
sewing. 
Environmental   Control  Program 
In  1972,   the  company  invested  $2.2 million  in  16 
projects to install or Improve pollution control facilities. 
In 1971,   the  company had invested $3-5 million,   and ex- 
pected to spend $4.5 million  in  1973.     The effort may 
sound modest,   but   it  is better than average in the industry. 
Burlington's already  improved waste treatment fa- 
cilities and techniques reduced water,   air and solid waste 
pollution in the year,   and the company planned to continue 
this effort.     Moreover,   the corporation tries to co-ordi- 
nate its pollution  control efforts with cleaner and more 
efficient manufacturing methods.     Success  in such an effort 
would help both the environment and the company's employees. 
Occupational  Health 
Just  as  the  coal-mining  industry  is  notorious  for 
its  dangers   in  black  lung diseases,   the  textile  industry 
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is  notorious   for  its  noise.     Moreover,   in  fiber glass 
manufacturing plants,   the danger is  the inhalation of the 
cancer-causing  dust.     The  tiny  particles  of  the  fiber 
also irritate skin.     Burlington has a safety and health 
committee responsible for initiating efforts in the identi- 
fication and elimination of potential hazards.     Further- 
more,   individual  plants  have  their own  personnel  to  cope 
with the problems of each. 
The  total  corporate  occupational health programs 
include medical screening of personnel,   hearing protection 
for  employees   in  noisy  plants,   and control   of  such  en- 
vironmental  conditions  as   temperature  and smell.     Safety 
depends on co-operation  on the part of all,   and the 
corporation  attempts  to promote  such a  co-operation. 
Financial  Review 
Consolidated sales 
For the fiscal year ending on September 30,   1972, 
the sales were  $l,8l6.1 million,   5-2$ above the 1971 
sales  which  totalled  $1,727.0 million.     The quarterly 
sales were  as   follows   (in  millions): 
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December 
March 
June 
September 
1972 
$438.0 
446.0 
471.0 
461.1 
1971 
424.0 
446.2 
428.7 
428.1 
Fiscal year total  $l,8l6.1  $1,727.0 
Increase 
3.3 
Negligible decrease 
9.9 
7.7 
5.2$ 
Earnings Before Taxes and Pre-tax Profit Margin 
Earnings  before taxes in the year were $93-9 
million,   which was 11.75* above the 1971 figure.     The 
comparative quarterly consolidated earnings before 
taxes and minority  interests  were  (in millions): 
* Increase 
1972 1971 (decrease) 
December I2l72~ ifO" (20.9) 
March 22.1 24.3 (   9.1) 
June 23.9 22.2 7.7 
September 26.7 10.8 147.2 
Fiscal year total $93-9 $84.1 11.' 
Pre-tax  profit  margins,   obtained by  dividing 
earnings   before  taxes  and minority  interests  by net 
sales,   increased  to  5.2*,   from 4.9* In  1971.     The  cor- 
poration's average pre-tax margin for the decade (1963-72) 
is 8.3*;   and its pre-tax profit margin base for the 
United States   operations under  the Economic  Stabili- 
zation Act of 1971  is about 10*. 
Net Earnings and Earnings Per Share 
The  net  earnings   for  fiscal  1972 were   $49.6 
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million,   whereas  for 1971 they were only  $40.1 million. 
The  comparative quarterly  consolidated primary 
net earnings  per share were reported thus: 
December 
March 
June 
September 
w 
.45 
.47 
^52_ 
1971 
$ .50 
.46 
.40 
.16 
^Increase 
(decrease) 
(12.0) 
(   2.2) 
17.5 
212.5 
Fully diluted earnings per share were $1.83 in fiscal 
1972 compared to $1.50 in 1971. 
Income Taxes and Investment Credit 
The provision made  for  taxes  on   income  in  1972 
was $44.2 million  compared to $43-9 million  in 1971. 
In  1972,   $39.8 million  represented  federal,   state,   and 
local  taxes   on   income,   whereas  in  1971  the amount  was 
$40.2 million.     The foreign taxes  in 1972 were $4.4 
million  and  $3-7  million  in  1971.     The  figures  for 
federal taxes made allowance for liabilities  in case 
of error. 
Investment tax credits were included in the 
year's earnings, and amounted to $7.1 million, equiva- 
lent to 24 cents per share, compared to $0.8 million in 
1971, equivalent to 3 cents per share.  The 1972 credits 
included 19 cents per share for 1972 capital investments; 
3 cents for 1971 capital investments (owing to the 
delayed enactment of the Revenue Act of 1971); and 
2 cents per share under the Revenue Act of 1962. 
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Dividends 
Burlington paid  $1.40 per  share dividend  in 
fiscal years  1972 and 1971.     The dividend pay-out 
ratio (total dividends divided by net earnings) was 
74.9$ in fiscal 1972 and 92.1$ in fiscal  1971.     The 
corporation's   ten-year dividend pay-out  ratio has 
averaged 46.9$ 
■^^B^aaggHj^wa^iiaTi'irTii' mnr»f i i tiliiiiM 
TABLE   3 
CONSOLIDATED STATEMENT OP EARNINGS 
Burlington Industries, Inc., and its subsidiaries, for the period, October 3, 1971 to 
September 30, 1972 with comparative figures from October 4, 1970 to October 2, 1971. 
All amounts, except per share data, are expressed in thousands. 
Net sales 
Cost of sales 
Selling, administrative and general expenses 
Interest charges 
Total costs and expenses 
Other income -- net 
Earnings, before taxes based on income and minority interests 
Provision for federal and other taxes based on income: 
Current 
Deferred 
1972 1971 
$1,816,119 $1, ,727,045 
1,552,703 1 , 478, 821 
146,130 140, 593 
28,652 28,656 
$1,727,485 $1 ,648,070 
88,634 
5,296 
78,975 
5,093 
93,930 84,068 
43,968 44,195 
211 (321) 
44,179 43,874 
49,751 40,194 
TABLE 3 - Continued 
Net earnings of subsidiary companies 
applicable to minority interests 
Net earnings 
144 
$ 49,607 
53 
40,141 
Average share outstanding during the period 26,636    26,374 
Net earnings per share: 
Primary 
Fully diluted 
Cash dividends per share 
$1.86 $1.52 
1.83 1.50 
1.40 1.40 
Depreciation & Amortization  included  in  above  costs  and expenses $     87,328     $82,075 
Source:   Burlington   Industries,   Inc.,   1972  Annual  Report,   p.   17. 
-S? 
TABLE 4 
The following table  illustrates Burlington's diversification in all textile markets 
and the shift in product mix according to market conditions: 
Fiscal Year    Percentage    Fiscal Year Percentage 
Sales (in millions' 
Products for Apparel Market 
Finished Fabrics for Apparel 
Unfinished Fabrics for Apparel 
Textured and Spun Yarns 
Hosiery (Men's, Women's and 
Children■s) 
Total 
Products for the Home 
Carpets and Rugs 
Domestics (Sheets, pillowcases, 
Blankets, Towels) 
Draperies, Drapery Fabrics, 
Upholstery, Ticking Fabrics 
Furniture 
Sales (in millions, 
Total 
$685 37.7# $641 37.1* 
85 4.7 81 4.7 
267 14.7 313 18.1 
101 
51,138 
5-6 , 
62.7^ 
115 
$1,150 
6.7 
66.6$ 
234 12.9 218 12.6 
77 4.2 58 3.4 
222 12.2 191 11.0 
59 
$592 
3.3 
32.6^ 
36 
$503 
2.1 
29.1$ 
o 
TABLE 4 - Continued 
Fiscal Year    Percentage    Fiscal Year    Percentage 
Products for Industry 
Total 
Sales (in millions) 
86 4.7 
$1,816 
Sales   (in millions) 
74 4.3 
$1,727 
Source: Burlington Industries 1972 Annual Report, p. 15. 
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Capital  Investment 
As of December 31*   1972,   the corporation's manu- 
facturing facilities  included 135 plants in the United 
States  (eighty-four located in North Carolina,   sixteen in 
Virginia,   nine in South Carolina;   the other twenty-six are 
scattered in  Alabama,   Arkansas,   California,   Florida,   Georgia, 
Massachusetts,   Mississippi,   Pennsylvania,   Tennessee,   Texas, 
and West  Virginia);   and there  are  thirty-four plants  in  ten 
foreign  countries  and  Puerto Rico. 
Aggregate floor space of domestic plants was approxi- 
mately  39  million  square  feet  at  the  close  of  1972.     Pro- 
duction  machinery   included  40,000 looms,   2.2 million 
spindles,   5,000 knitting machines  and dyeing and  finishing 
facilities. 
During fiscal  1972,   five plants were either closed 
or sold,   four plants  were  reopened and eight  plants were 
transferred from one division to another.     Capital expendi- 
tures for property,   plant and equipment  in fiscal 1972 
were  $114.7  million   including  $8.2 million  for consolidated 
international  operations.     Expenditures were $103.9 million 
in  fiscal   1971,   including  $17.3 million  for  international 
operations.     Approximately  60# of  the  capital   investments 
in 1971 and 1972 were for modernization and 40$ for 
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expansion.     In  fiscal 1973,   the Company expected to spend 
$110 million to $125 million for the same. 
The corporation had other properties in the year. 
It had,   and  still  has,   a  large,   modern  office building  in 
Greensboro,   N.C.     The  company disposed of  its new research 
center  in  Greensboro with  its  shift   of research responsi- 
bilities from the corporate to the divisional level. 
Burlington also had transportation terminals and warehouses 
at Burlington,   Fayetteville,   Ranlo,   N.C;   Clarksville, 
Dublin,   Lynchburg,   Virginia;   Rossville,   Ga.;   Los Angeles, 
Cal.;   Memphis,   Tenn.;   and North Bergen,   N.J. 
Employment 
Burlington Industries employed 84,000 people in 
fiscal 1972,   some 2,000 more than  in 1971.     The table 
below shows   the  Corporation's  ten-year  employment  record. 
Number of  Employees 
At the end of 
fiscal year United States 
1972 73,000 
1971 70,000 
1970 75,000 
1969 76,000 
1968 74,000 
1967 70,000 
1966 67,000 
1965 63,000 
1964 65,000 
1963 63,000 
Consolidated 
International 
11,000 
12,000 
12,000 
10,000 
9,000 
4,000 
2,000 
2,000 
2,000 
2,000 
Total 
84,000 
82,000 
87,000 
86,000 
83,000 
74,000 
69,000 
65,000 
67,000 
65,000 
94 
The 1972 increase in the number of employees in the United 
States  mainly  reflected higher production  requirements 
and the  resumption  of  business  at  certain  plants  which 
had been closed in 1971- 
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TABLE 5 
CONSOLIDATED STATEMENT OP EARNINGS (In millions) 
1972     1971     1970 
Net sales $l,8l6.1 $1,727.0 $1,821.5 
Costs  and  expenses: 
Labor 
Raw materials,   Labor 
Chemicals,   upkeep,   utilities    243.5 
Other  expenses 
Depreciation,   amortization 
Selling,   general expenses 
Interest charges 
Total costs and expenses 
Other  Income 
Net 
539.7 497.5 492.9 
650.5 641.7 681.3 
210.7 212.1 
46.1 51.5 52.2 
87.3 82.1 78.0 
141.2 135.8 135.1 
28.7 28.7 24.4 
1,727.5 1,648.0 1,676.0 
88.6 79.0 145.5 
5.3 5.1 5.7 
Earnings 
before taxes based on  income 
and minority  interests 
Provision  for  taxes 
Less  net  earnings 
of  subsidiary  co.   applicable 
to minority  interests 
Net  earnings 
Less preferred  dividends  paid 
Earnings  available  to 
common  shareholders 
Common  dividends  paid 
Statistics 
Earnings  before  taxes  as % 
of net sales 
Earnings  before  taxes  as % 
of capital employed 
Net  earnings   (after preferred 
dividends),   # of  common  equity 
Times  interest  charges   earned       4.3 
93.9 
44.2 
49.7 
.1 
49.6 
49.6 
37.1 
5.2$ 
8.0$ 
6.5$ 
84.1 
43.9 
151.2 
78.7 
40.2 72.5 
.1 1.1 
40.1 71.4 
40.1 
36.9 
4.9? 
7.2? 
5-4? 
3.9 
71.4 
36.6 
8.3? 
13.6? 
10.0? 
7.2 
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TABLE 5 - Continued 
CONSOLIDATED STATEMENT OP EARNINGS (in millions; 
1969     1968     1967 
Net  Sales 
Costs  and  expenses: 
Raw materials,   Labor 
Labor 
Chemicals,   upkeep,   utilities 
Other  expenses 
Depreciation,   amortization 
Selling,   general expenses 
Interest charges 
Total costs and expenses 
Other  income 
Net 
Earnings 
before taxes based on income 
and minority interests 
Provision for taxes 
Less net earnings 
of subsidiary co. applicable 
to minority interests 
Net earnings 
Less preferred dividends paid 
Earnings available to 
common shareholders 
Common dividends paid 
Statistics 
Earnings before taxes as # 
of net sales 
Earnings  before  taxes  as  J6 
of capital employed 
Net earnings   (after preferred 
dividends),   % of common equity    11.q 
Times  interest  charges  earned 9-0 
$1,764.7    $1,619.2    $1,364.6 
677.6 630.8 547.3 
466.8 417.8 359.7 
195.3 181.8 155.7 
44.2 41.2 33.5 
72.9 65.O 59.6 
124.7 102.7 87.3 
20.9 17.8 16.1 
1,602.4    1,457.1    1,259.2 
162.3 
3.3 
162.I 
3.4 
105.4 
2.7 
165.6 
86.6 
165.5 
85.5 
108.1 
49.4 
79.0 80.0 58.7 
.9 1.0 .5 
78.1 79.0 58.2 
78.1 
36.3 
9.4$ 
16.2* 
79.0 
31-7 
10.2? 
17.8? 
13.1? 
10.3 
58.2 
30.2 
7.9$ 
12.4$ 
10.4$ 
7.7 
97 
TABLE 5  -  Continued 
CONSOLIDATED STATEMENT  OP EARNINGS 
1966 
Net Sales 
Costs  and  expenses: 
Raw materials,   Labor 
Labor 
Chemicals,   upkeep,   utilities 
Other expenses 
Depreciation,   amortization 
Selling,   general  expenses 
Interest charges 
Total  costs  and  expenses 
Other  income 
Net 
Earnings 
before  taxes  based  on   income 
and minority  interests 
Provision for taxes 
Less  net  earnings 
of subsidiary  co.   applicable 
to minority  interests 
Net  earnings 
Less  preferred dividends  paid 
Earnings available to 
common  shareholders 
Common dividends  paid 
Statistics 
Earnings  before  taxes  as  % 
of net  sales 
Earnings before taxes as $ 
of capital  employed 
Net  earnings   (after  preferred 
dividends),   % of  common  equity 
Times  interest  charges  earned 
^1,374.8 
560.8 
340.0 
151.9 
29.6 
49.7 
85.6 
13.5 
1,231.1 
140.7 
4.2 
144.9 
66.7 
78.2 
1.1 
77.1 
77.1 
26.2 
10.6# 
18.0# 
15.0$ 
11.7 
\In millions) 
1965 
$1,313.3 
565.2 
311.0 
135.2 
29.2 
45.9 
87.0 
11.4 
1,184.9 
128.4 
4.6 
133.0 
62.9 
70.1 
1.5 
68.6 
68.6 
20.9 
10.1# 
19.4^ 
15.2# 
12.7 
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TABLE 5  -  Continued 
Net  Sales 
Costs and  expenses; 
Raw materials,   Labor 
Labor 
Chemicals,   upkeep,   utilities 
Other expenses 
Depreciation,   amortization 
Selling,   general expenses 
Interest charges 
Total costs and expenses 
Other  income 
Net 
Earnings 
before taxes based on   income 
and minority   interests 
Provision for taxes 
Less net  earnings 
of subsidiary  co.   applicable 
to minority   interests 
Net  earnings 
Less  preferred  dividends  paid 
Earnings  available  to 
common  shareholders 
Common  dividends  paid 
Statistics 
Earnings  before   taxes  as  % 
of net sales 
Earnings before  taxes as % 
of capital employed 
Net  earnings   (after preferred 
dividends),   $  of  common   equity 
Times   interest   charges   earned 
EARNINGS (in  millions) 
1964 1963 
1,206.4 $1,085.0 
531.6 481.0 
285.7 260.5 
125-8 119.1 
29.6 23.7 
41.6 37.4 
79.5 69.3 
10.0 8.1 
1,103.8 
102.6 
2.1 
17.5$ 
12.55 
11.5 
999.1 
85.9 
2.4 
104.7 
52.4 
88.3 
46.9 
52.3 41.4 
1.4 .8 
50.9 40.6 
.9 
50.9 39-7 
16.9 14.4 
15.3# 
10.6# 
11.9 
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FOOTNOTES 
CHAPTER THREE 
Seymour Freegood,   op_.   cit.   ("What Happened At 
Burlington   .   .   ."),   p.   105. 
2Ibid., p. 110. 
3Ibld., p. 110. 
4Ibld., p. 110. 
5lbid., p. 110. 
^Burlington  Industries,   Incorporated,   (Booklet. 
Burlington   Industries  Research Center,   n.d.). 
^Ibid.,   (no page numbers). 
8Burlington   Industries,   Burlington  Industries  Annual 
Report,   1972,   p.   3. 
^Burlington   Industries,   Burlington   Industries  Annual 
Report,   1968,   p.   23. 
10 Ibid.,   p.   32. 
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SUMMARY 
Burlington   Industries was  begun  by  the Love  family. 
In  the  beginning  there  was  not much to depend on.     The 
senior Love had had no formal education   in the field,   and 
Spencer Love  had no  experience.     But  James  Lee Love  had  a 
sound reputation,   and his  son had extraordinary ambition 
and courage.     Spencer Love turned his  inexperience into a 
great asset by being flexible in the operation of his 
business.     Whereas the questionable quality of rayon  (in 
the twenties)  would have prevented an experienced business- 
man  from trying  to  build a  business  relying  on  the  fiber, 
Spencer Love  took a bold step and succeeded. 
But  the career of a business executive had an ad- 
ditional  dimension   for  Spencer Love.     He aspired to more 
than  the  mere  accumulation   of wealth.     There was  an  element 
of  creativity   in   the  process  of building up  the  company. 
His  company   started  out  with  several young people  in  very 
responsible  positions,   and  they grew with  Burlington.     In 
later years  Love was  still  anxious  to  have  outstanding 
young people   in  the  company,   no doubt  realizing  the difference 
such people could make.     He himself hardly  lost the vigor of 
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his earlier years,   and his  famous process of expanding 
Burlington continued until the very last day of his life. 
Perhaps the unique quality of the corporation is 
its separate divisions.     The system has always existed at 
the  company  and will  no doubt  continue.     The  individual 
division,   each with a large amount of autonomy,   decides 
the quality and amount of products for its market,     when- 
ever there is an  over-lapping between the products of two 
divisions,   the divisions compete with each other.    They 
have also their own Research and Development facilities. 
This practice was temporarily interrupted in favor of a 
Central Research System,   but  in 1972 the company sold the 
Central  facility  and  reverted to Divisional  effort.     The 
divisions are better able to handle such activities be- 
cause  of  their  proximity   to their markets.     Burlington's 
Corporate  Structure  is  thus  not  only  highly democratic 
but  also  very  efficient.     The  Division  Managers are  very 
proud of  their  independence  and the  Corporate  Officers 
have more  time  to  concentrate  on  broader policies  of  the 
Corporation. 
After  the  death  of J.   Spencer Love,   his work was 
taken  over by  a  team made up  of Charles  Myers,   Jr.   and 
Henry  E.   Rauch.      In  1967, Ely  R.   Callaway  assumed the 
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position of Presidency,   while Myers assumed others such as 
Chairman of Executive and Management Committees,   while 
retaining the Chairmanship of the Board of Directors. 
The new team made some changes:   halting the expansion of 
the  Company   in  favor  of  internal   improvements mainly  through 
the installation of newer systems.    But foreign expansion 
was given a major emphasis which resulted in a greater 
share  in  foreign  markets   -  especially  those  of Europe. 
The new team also made the company a more normal one by 
emphasizing profits and reducing the role of younger 
persons in making policy decisions. 
The over-riding goal of the new team (now made up 
of Ely  R.   Callaway,   Jr.,   President,   and Charles  F.   Myers, 
Jr.,   Chairman)   is  the   same as  Love's  though:   Burlington's 
welfare  is   everyone's   supreme  concern.     The  team has  suc- 
ceeded  quite well   in   its  goals  and  is   likely  to  be  able  to 
keep  the  Corporation   in   the  forefront  of  the  textile  in- 
dustry.     If Burlington's stocks are any Indication of the 
state  it  is   in,   one  may  say  that  the corporation  has done 
quite well  since the new team's succession.     In years 
immediately   following  the  death of  Spencer Love,   the  com- 
pany's  stocks   had  almost  doubled  (from around  $24  to about  $^; 
but recently  they  have  been  ranging  from about   $31  to  $35- 
Such fluctuations  are  of course  normal   in  corporate  history. 
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CONCLUSION 
Ever  since  its  founding,Burlington  Industries,   In- 
corporated,   has  been  a  very  successful  business  corporation. 
The company's accomplishments were made possible because 
its  officers  understood the  free  enterprise  system in 
America,   and because there was enough room for expansion. 
Recently however,   the corporation seems to be facing a 
dilemma.     Having consolidated a large part of the American 
textile market,   Burlington has to decide whether or not 
it  is going  to  branch  out   into  other  fields;   and  if  so, 
which fields.     Related areas such as furniture and chemi- 
cals have already been  entered into.     Perhaps the corporation 
could devote more  resources  and  efforts  into  these  fields. 
Burlington might attempt  to capture an  even larger 
part of the textile market.     This may be a little difficult 
because  the  Federal  Government  may not  permit  such an 
endeavor.     The  Federal  Government's  anti-trust  division 
has  been  watching  Burlington's  efforts  to consolidate  a 
major part  of  the  American  market,   so  it may  not  permit 
Burlington  to  proceed much  further in  that  direction.     The 
company  has  been  warned  not  to proceed  in  attempts  to 
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acquire other firms without the Federal Government's 
sanction,   in  spite of the fact that the American textile 
market is  so well  shared that there is room for more con- 
solidation.     The entire textile market in the United States 
is worth approximately  twenty  billion  dollars  annually, 
and the annual  sales of Burlington amount to less than two 
billion  dollars.     But  the  disparity  between  Burlington and 
its  competitors   is  great.     The  Government  presumably 
supposes that Burlington could easily eliminate others 
if allowed a free rein. 
But Burlington has always been able to adjust to 
the prevailing conditions,   and so  it is reasonable to 
suppose  that   it  can  do  so  again.     Burlington  has  been  the 
greatest   textile  corporation   in  the  history  of the  textile 
industry for more than a decade,   and it shows all signs of 
becoming even greater. 
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APPENDIX 
I.  A History  of  Rayon  Fiber:   (A history  of the  rayon fiber 
can be derived from a number of sources.    The one given 
below is  derived  from Encyclopaedia Brltannlca,   William 
Eenton,   publisher,   Encyclopaedia Brltannlca,   Inc.,   Chicago, 
I960,   vol.   21,   pp.   708-709B. ) 
The  first  person  to  think of the possibility  of 
producing artificial fiber by a process similar to the 
silkworm's  spinning was  Robert  Hooke,   an  English scientist, 
who discussed the  subject  in his book Micrographla,  pub- 
lished In 1664. 
Rene'  A.P.   de  Reaumur,   a French Scientist,   predicted 
in  1734 the manufacture  of an  artificial  fiber from gums, 
resins,   similar  to varnishes  then manufactured. 
Louis  Schwabe,   an  English silk weaver,   exhibited a 
machine for manufacturing artificial silk in 1842.    The 
machine had nozzles  with  fine  holes  through which liquid 
was  forced  to  form  filaments.     Today  the  same  principal  is 
used to  spin  rayon. 
In   1846,   C.F.   Schonbein,   a Swiss  chemist,   discovered 
nitrocelloluse. 
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In  1855,   first known patent for the manufacture of 
the rayon fiber was  issued to George Audemars. 
In 1883,   Sir Joseph W.   Swan used the previous ma- 
terial and methods to squeeze a nitrocelloluse solution 
Into a coagulating medium and denitrating the filament. 
In 1885,   Sir  Swan   exhibited  a  few articles made  from the 
filaments,   but did not  try  to explore the textile possi- 
bilities of  the   invention. 
The process  known  as  Nitrocelloluse  Process was 
realized by Count  Hilaire de Chardonnet,   "father of the 
rayon industry,"   in 1878.     In that year his experiments 
began,   and in  1884 the  first fiber was produced.    The pro- 
cess used a nitrocelloluse  solution  of pulp  derived from 
mulberry leaves,   coagulating the filaments in heated air. 
At  the  Paris   exhibition  in  1889,   he  showed articles 
made from artificial  fibers  and  secured a  financial  backing 
to build a factory   at  Besancon,   Prance.     There,   the first 
commercial production  of  rayon  began  in  1891.     (His pro 
was  later modified  by  Lehner,   who used a  solution  of alcohol, 
instead of warm air,   to coagulate the filaments. 
In  the  United  States,   the  first attempt  to manu- 
facture  the  fiber was undertaken  by  the American  Viscose 
Company,   which  built  a  factory  at  Marcus  Hook,   Pennsylvania 
in 1911 for that purpose. 
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